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Abstract
This note examines the international efforts undertaken by nations collectively and individually to resolve extraterritorial discovery conflicts. Discussed are the international efforts to achieve
uniform discovery international discovery standards. The U.S. and U.K. systems and their joint
efforts to establish a set of legal tenets and norms to resolve costly extraterritorial discovery disputes.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF U.S. AND BRITISH
APPROACHES TO DISCOVERY CONFLICTS: ACHIEVING A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY
Daniela Levarda*
INTRODUCTION

Extraterritorial discovery orders issued unilaterally by domestic courts are a primary source of conflict in international
litigation.1 Judicial requests for information located across state
boundaries are considered intrusive upon the sovereignty of nations,' and are countered by strict confidentiality objectives en-

forced through the imposition of criminal and civil penalties for
disclosure.'

Domestic courts and international litigants have

found it difficult to accommodate their own need for information as well as other countries' secrecy concerns.' These difficulties have prompted multinational efforts to set forth uniform

procedures for obtaining discovery abroad, such as the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Hague Convention" or "Convention") 5 and bilateral treaties. 6
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, ForeignBlocking Statutes and U.S. Discovery: A Conflict of
NationalPolicies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1061 (1984) (discussing conflicts arising
from different national discovery that permeate international legal system); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Introduction:DiscoveringDiscovery, InternationalStyle, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 957 (1984) (identifying discovery as main battleground in controversy over extraterritorial jurisdiction).
2. Lenore B. Browne, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1320, 1320 (1983). Many governments resent extraterritorial discovery
as an infringement upon their sovereignty, and enact blocking legislation in order to
thwart such discovery orders. Id.
3. David. E. Teitelbaum, Strict Enforcement of ExtraterritorialDiscovery, 38 STAN. L.
Rav. 841 (1986). Many nations that find extraterritorial discovery orders offensive to
their sovereignty have enacted legislation that prohibits compliance with such orders at
the risk of criminal penalties. Id.
4. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 1, at 1063 (discussing inability of domestic courts to
satisfactorily accommodate competing national interests in disclosure versus confidentiality); Browne, supra note 2, at 1320 (discussing difficulties facing litigants confronted
with hard choice of obeying one court's discovery order or complying with another
forum's non-disclosure laws).
5. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
6. See PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS - LAW
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Variant national policies, however, such as the propensity of
the United States to compel broad extraterritorial discovery,7
contrasted by the United Kingdom's deference to foreign confidentiality concerns,8 have preserved a marked disparity in the
adjudication of discovery disputes, both on a global and a domestic level. 9 Furthermore, these differences have encouraged
the proliferation of blocking statutes' ° and secrecy laws"
211 (1993). The United States has negotiated agreements setting forth
dispute resolution procedures with several countries. Id.; see, e.g., Agreement Between
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.IA.S.
No. 8291 (regulating cooperation in enforcement of antitrust policies between U.S. and
German antitrust authorities); Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984) (mandating cooperation in resolving
jurisdictional and economical conflicts resulting from differing antitrust policies between United States and Canada); Agreement Between the United States and Australia
Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, Jan 16, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 10365, 34
U.S.T. 388, 1369 U.N.T.S. 43 (establishing bilateral framework for consultations with
regard to implementation of antitrust policies between United States and Australia);
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 61 Antitrust 8 Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at
382 (mandating coordination of antitrust investigations to minimize disruption to international trade). Although these agreements foster more than procedural cooperation
between nations, their primary concern lies in the resolution of international discovery
disputes. STEPHAN, supra, at 211.
7. See Douglas E. Rosenthal & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALl Restatement's Provisionson Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1075, 1076-77 (1984).
The United States may be the only nation which believes that the unilateral extension
of its broad discovery laws extraterritorially does not violate international law. Id. at
1075; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
AND POLICY

rep. n.1 (1986) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]

(discussing international contro-

versy concerning discovery abroad). "The United States' position ... has been that
persons who do business in the United States, or who otherwise bring themselves within
United States jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate, are subject to the burdens as
well as the benefits of United States law, including the laws of discovery." Id.

8. See

DAVID MCCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL.JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE

59 (1992) (discussing

British courts' sensitivity to foreign secrecy policies as reason for more restrained use of
extraterritorial discovery orders than customary in U.S. litigation).
9. Id. at 56-59.
10. See In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 614 n.29 (5th Cir. 1985) (defining
blocking statute as law passed by government imposing penalty upon nationals for complying with foreign court's discovery request). In an attempt to curtail the extraterritorial exercise of discovery powers within their borders, many nations have adopted secrecy laws and blocking statutes that prevent the disclosure of specific information.
Silvia B. Pifiera-Visquez, ExtraterritoriaJurisdiction and InternationalBanking: A Conflict of
Interests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 466 (1988).
11. Pifiera-Visquez, supra note 10, at 466. Secrecy laws are a recognized means of
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designed to obstruct the disclosure of information 12 across state
borders.13 Thus, litigants such as multinational corporations,'
whose activities subject them to the jurisdictions of several nations, 1 5 are often faced with the choice of obeying discovery orders at the cost of sanctions abroad, or having otherwise meritorious claims prejudiced by lack of evidence." This conflict of
laws has become an impediment to international economic de8
velopment 17 and a strain on judicial resources.'
This Note examines the international efforts undertaken by
ensuring a client's confidentiality in commercial transactions, and thereby also attracting foreign investment. Id. at 467. The effect of both blocking statutes and secrecy
laws are the same. Id. at 466.
12. STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 211. Australia, Bermuda, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Germany, France, Liechtenstein, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom have enacted such statutes. Id. In addition, the Commission of
the European Communities is considering a more general directive on the subject. Id.
13. See PUBLIC POLICY IN TRANSNATONAL RELATIONSHIPS (Mauro Rubino-Sammartano & C.GJ. Morse eds.,), at USA-203 (1991) [hereinafter RUBINO-SAMMARTANO &
MORSE] (discussing extraterritorial reach of U.S. discovery processes as incentive to diplomatic protests and legislation to block production of evidence).
14. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILUP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 863 (1991).

The multinational enterprise or corporation, an established feature of the international
economic environment, generally consists of a group of corporations, each organized
under the law of some state, linked by common managerial and financial control and
pursuing integrated policies. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 213 cmts. a-f. A state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe laws for acts of its corporate national committed outside of its territory. Id. cmt.
b. Connections other than nationality, however, may be significant for the exercise of
such jurisdiction. Id. cmt. d. The fact that a substantial part of a corporation's shares
are owned by nationals of that state, or that the corporation is managed from an office
located in that state, or that the corporation's principal place of business is in that state,

authorizes the particular state to treat the corporation as analogous to its national. Id.
In addition, other states having such links to the corporation may also exercise jurisdiction over the corporation for limited purposes. Id.
16. Rosdeitcher, supra note 1, at 1062-63. In situations where the subject of a nonU.S. secrecy state is faced with a discovery order from a U.S. court, a legal conflict

ensues, whereby the U.S. judge will threaten sanctions against the entity for non-compliance, while the opposing state will threaten criminal or civil penalties should its subject comply with the disclosure request. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(c) (stating
that U.S. court may draw unfavorable inferences toward party unable to comply with

discovery due to disclosure prohibition abroad, even when party made good faith effort
to secure waiver of confidentiality from non-U.S. jurisdiction).
17. See STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 302 (stating that substantive differences such as
disclosure laws constitute regulatory impediment to international market, particularly
within context of securities transactions).
18. See David J. Gerber, InternationalDiscovery After Awrospatiale: The Quest For An
Analytical Framework, 82 A.J.I.L. 521 (1988) (discussing injurious effects of extraterritorial discovery conflicts on effectiveness of U.S. litigation as well as their interference
with policies of both United States and other nations).
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nations collectively and individually to resolve extraterritorial
discovery conflicts. Part I discusses the plight of multinational
corporations as examples of litigants most often embroiled in
costly discovery conflicts. Part I also examines international efforts to achieve uniform standards of extraterritorial discovery.
Part II discusses relevant discovery laws and judicial principles
employed by the United States and the United Kingdom for
resolving disclosure conflicts in the context of multinational litigation. Part III argues that the various legal tenets developed
unilaterally by U.S. and British courts have failed to achieve consistent norms in adjudicating discovery conflicts, resulting in the
inequitable administration of domestic laws. Part III also sets
forth a proposal for a neutral international panel that would
promulgate not only common procedures of disclosure, but also
a uniform structure of analysis for the adjudication of interjurisdictional discovery conflicts. This Note concludes that such a
system would objectively address contradictory concerns of confidentiality versus disclosure, as well as comport with the aims of
global economic development.
I. MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS TO RECONCILE JUDICIAL
DEMAND FOR INFORMATION WITH CONCERNS
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The enactment of blocking legislation1 9 designed to insulate commercial2 0 information against the broad discovery powers exercised by nations such as the United States2" has placed
international litigants in the difficult position of having to comply with conflicting jurisdictional disclosure policies.2" This result is increasingly2 apparent within the context of international
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining blocking legislation).
20. SeeJonathan I. Blackman & Mitchell A. Lowenthal, United States, in DISPATCHING THE OPPosIToN: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, INT'L FIN. L. REv.,
Aug. 1992 at 50 (noting that international commercial litigation in United States frequently involves issues of extraterritorial discovery and potential conflicts with non-U.S.
secrecy laws).
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing broad extraterritorial discovery practices of U.S. courts).
22. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 1, at 1062-63 (discussing plight of international
litigants subject to conflicting disclosure policies of different jurisdictions).
23. See Morris H. Deutsch, JudicialAssistance: ObtainingEvidence in the United States,
Under 28 US.C. § 1782, for Use in a Foreign or InternationalTribunal, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 175, 176 n.6 (1982) (stating that significant increase in international transactions has led to higher incidence of multinational litigation).

1344 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 18:1340

corporate litigation.2 4 The rules of procedure adopted at the
Hague Convention 2 5 have attempted to ease some of the hardships encountered in obtaining discovery abroad in civil and
commercial suits. 26 In addition, bilateral treaties have invited
governmental cooperation with regard to the resolution of interjurisdictional discovery disputes.2 7
A. MultinationalCorporationsand Intejurisdictional
Discovery Conflicts
The significant increase in international transactions 28 has
led to the establishment of multinational corporations as perhaps the most important actors in the world economy.29' The
expansion of commercial activities undertaken by transnational
enterprises has continued despite the recess of world economic
growth and the subsequent heightening of international economic uncertainties."0 With newly available opportunities for investment, transnational enterprises have become more diversified commercially and geographically. 3 ' Currently, a large transnational firm typically maintains economic ties to several nations
that furnish it with raw materials, labor, and capital.1 2 This expansion in economic activity has clouded the delineations of nationality38 with respect to corporations doing business across na24. See Henry Harfield, The Implications of U.S. ExtraterritorialDiscovery Proceedings
Against Multinational Corporations For the Judiciary, 16 N.Y.U.'J. IT'x- L. & POL. 973
(1984). The detrimental impact of U.S. discovery proceedings on multinational corporations reverberates through the U.S. judicial system and throughout international law.
Id.
25. Hague Convention, supra note 5, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
26. Robert J. Augustine, Obtaining InternationalJudicialAssistance Under the Federal
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters: An Exposition of the Proceduresand a PracticalExample: In re Westinghouse Uranium
ContractsLitigation, 10 GA.J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 101, 103-04 (1980). The Hague Convention is the most extensive and successful international effort to simplify and expedite
the process ofjudicial assistance in procuring evidence extraterritorially among signatories. Id.
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing bilateral treaties for judicial
assistance and cooperation).
28. See STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 32 (discussing increase in international transactions).
29. The Process of Transnationalizationin the 1980's, [1988] U.N.C.T.C. Rep. No. 26,
at 5.
30. Id.
31. STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 32.

32. Id. at 33.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRn) § 213. "For purposes of international law, a corporation

1995]

EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY

1345

tional borders, subjecting the enterprises to the procedural demands of multiple jurisdictions.'M The resulting international
commercial litigation has served as the legal battle ground for
interjurisdictional discovery battles 5 with multinational corporations

6

as the often unwilling warriors."

The conflicts center on sovereigns' reluctance to submit the
domestic conduct of their national corporations to the scrutiny
of other nations that share jurisdiction over those enterprises by
reason of sustaining the effects 8 of their activities.3 9 Although
there has been considerable impetus to create international regulatory standards for multinational enterprises, 40 a uniform system of settling disclosure demands in transnational corporate lithas the nationality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organized."
Id. In addition to being a national of its state of incorporation, however, a multinational corporation may also be considered a national of a state from which it draws its
labor force, where its investors are, where it sells its products, or where its corporate
headquarters are located. Id. cmt. d; STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 33.
34. Harfield, supra note 24, at 973.
35. See JAMES R. A'irwoOD & KINCMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINESS ABROAD § 15.10 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing jurisdictional conflicts resulting from
U.S. custom of extraterritorial discovery).
36. See Lee Paikin, Problems of ObtainingEvidence in Foreign States for Use in Federal
CriminalProsecutions,21 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 234 (1986). The rise of multinational corporations with branches or subsidiaries in different states, each controlling its
own domain of information, has added a special dimension to international litigation.
Id.
37. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1081 (discussing special situation
of third-party multinational corporations, such as banks, embroiled in interjurisdictional discovery conflicts based on holding of confidential information as fiduciaries for
others).
38. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 14, at 726. Territorial regulation may be
extended by a state to conduct by a multinational corporation which has limited contact with that state, but whose acts caused an effect within the borders of that state. Id.
Western European nations have often criticized the exercise of such extended jurisdiction by the United States, which leads to the application of U.S. laws extraterritorially in
areas such as antitrust, export controls, securities trading, and environmental protection. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402. A nation has basis for jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory."' Id.
39. Books on TrarsnationalCorporations, [1984] U.N.C.T.C. Rep. No. 18, at 58 (reviewing A.H. HERMAN, CoNFucrs OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AcTwrVry. ISSUES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

(1982)).

40. See Transnational Corporationsin World Development, United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, Third Survey, at 106, U.N. Doc. ST/TC/46, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.II.A.14 (1983) (advocating multilateral approach in settling intergovernmental disputes regarding treatment of transnational corporations, particularly where different
jurisdictions impose conflicting requirements on various entities of transnational enterprises).
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igation has not yet been achieved.4 1 Consequently, the disparate
policies that are continually employed in the unilateral adjudication of discovery disputes have heightened the uncertainty in
commercial litigation4 2 and have been considered a trade barrier that limits the access of multinational corporations to global
markets.4'
B. The Hague Convention: An InternationalEffort to Achieve
Uniform Proceduresfor ObtainingExtraterritorialDiscovery

The most prominent international effort to reconcile broad
interests in discovery with concerns of confidentiality has been
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in

Civil and Commercial44 Matters.45 The Convention was intended to codify a universal procedure for the procurement of
evidence in litigation among signatory nations 46 that could be
tailored to the discovery practices of both common law4 7 and

civil law4 regimes.49 The proposed mechanism for obtaining ev41. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1081.

42. Id. at 1080-81.
43. Id. at 1080.
44. See 1 BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL § 5-1-4, at 162 (1990). Although Article I of the Hague Convention limits its utility

to obtaining evidence in "civil or commercial matters," the text of the convention does
not define either term. Id. Signatories to the Hague Convention subscribe to divergent
views of what constitutes "civil or commercial" matters. Id. For example, civil jurisdictions do not consider administrative issues to come within the scope of the Hague Convention, while signatories such as the United States attribute a more inclusive, liberal
meaning to the "civil and commercial" limitation. Id. at 163.
45. Hague Convention, supra note 5, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. The following states are parties to the Hague Convention: Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and the United States. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DiGESr - Selected International Conventions, at IC-17 (1993).
46. Augustine, supra note 26, at 103-04. The Hague Convention is the most prominent international effort to simplify and expedite the process of procuring evidence
across national borders through judicial assistance among signatories. Id.
47. See HARRY W. JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD 5 (1980).
The Anglo-American legal system, unlike the "civil law" system which prevails
with variations in most of the countries of the western world, explicitly recognizes the doctrine of precedent, known also as the principle of stare decisis. It is
the distinctive policy of a "common law" legal system that past judicial decisions are "generally binding" for the disposition of factually similar present
controversies.
Id.
48. Id.; see Ar-rwooD & BREWSTER, supra note 35, at 227 (discussing discovery differ-
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idence among signatories operates principally through letters of
request' ° transmitted from courts to designated Central Authorities 1 in each of the participating states.5 2 This process is intended to eliminate the intricate, time-consuming diplomatic
channels otherwise utilized by domestic courts to obtain transnational judicial assistance.13 As long as signatories to the Conven-

tion follow the prescribed procedures for seeking relevant information, fellow members are under an international legal obliga-

tion to render a minimum amount of cooperation in response.54
This duty can be modified by subsequent treaties entered into
55
independent of the Hague Convention.
Although the Convention was intended to harmonize the
means of obtaining international discovery,5 6 it also incorporated provisions allowing signatories to opt out of the agreed
procedures.5 7 At least three clauses included in the text of the
ences between United States and civil law countries). Discovery in civil law countries is
ajudicial function undertaken by the courts themselves. Id. at 228. Should U.S. counsel engage in U.S. style discovery in civil law jurisdictions, their conduct may be taken as
a transgression upon the jurisdiction of local non-U.S. courts. Id.
49. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 851.
50. Hague Convention, supra, note 5, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. The English term "letter of request" is synonymous with the term "letter rogatory" used in U.S.
discovery procedures. RisrAu, supra note 44, § 5-1-3, at 161.
51. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. at 2558, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
Article 2 requires each signatory to establish a "central authority" for the receipt of
requests from other signatories. Id. In the United States, for example, the Department
of Justice has been designated as the central authority which receives requests for discovery from abroad. RIsTAu, supra note 44, § 5-1-5, at 168.
52. RISTAU, supra note 44, § 5-1-5 at 168-69.
53. Id. § 5-1-5, at 169.
54. Id. § 5-2-7, at 225-26. A signatory to the Hague Convention has an obligation
to respond to another signatory's letter of request with a minimum amount ofjudicial
assistance. Id. The minimum obligation imposed on signatories to the Hague Convention is to honor letters of request. Id. at 226 n.77. Signatories may expand or curtail
this obligation by filing declarations upon ratification setting forth any reservations with
regard to providing evidence under Convention rules. Id.
55. Id. Treaties worked out by individual signatories independent of the Hague
Convention and other provisions of the Convention itself that allow participants to opt
out of certain procedures of discovery create different obligations to honor discovery
requests among signatories to the Hague Convention. Id.
56. See A-rwOOD & BREws'rER, supra note 35, § 15.12, at 230-31 (discussing objectives of Hague Convention to speed and standardize process of obtaining discovery
abroad via letters rogatory).
57. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
Article 9 mandates that a state executing a letter of request shall apply its own laws with
regard to the procedures to be followed. Id. Furthermore, should the requesting state
demand the use of specified methods under Article 9, the executing state may refuse to
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Hague Convention have limited its utility as a viable discovery
alternative to liberal disclosure approaches exercised by nations
such as the United States.5 8 First, the Convention grants the ultimate authority to honor letters rogatory to the signatory where
discovery is sought, which may not agree with the scope of disclosure requested. 59 Second, the rules set forth by the Convention
do not authorize litigants to search for information to the extent
permissible under some members' domestic evidence policies.6'
For example, Article 2361 allows states to opt out of established
procedures with regard to pre-trial discovery.62 In the United
States, however, litigants are permitted to obtain discovery of all
comply if it deems such methods incompatible with its domestic law. Id. Article 23
allows signatories to opt out of discovery obligations with regard- to pre-trial discovery.
Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243. Article
33 permits a signatory, at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, to opt out of
the obligations set forth in Chapter II of the Hague Convention, dealing with the taking
of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 33, 23 U.S.T. at 2571, 847 U.N.T.S. at 247. Furthermore, Article
12 allows a signatory to refuse letters rogatory if it considers that enforcement of same
would prejudice its security or sovereignty. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 12, 23
U.S.T. at 2562-63, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
58. See Gerber, supra note 18, at 545 (discussing relevance of pre-trial limitations
that circumscribe utility of Hague Convention as alternative to U.S. discovery procedures); Martin Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters: Several Notes ConcerningIts Scope, Methods and Compulion, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1031, 1053 (1984) (discussing liberal discovery as fundamental principle of U.S. judicial proceedings).
59. STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 210. "[The Hague Convention] grants the ultimate
authority to accept or reject a request to the courts of the country where discovery is
sought, which may not take as generous a view as do the courts of the country seeking
discovery." Id.; see Gerber, supra note 18, at 544 n.131 (stating that despite convenience
of letters rogatory, fact that they do not oblige situs state to honor request negates their
utility as viable alternative to U.S. discovery procedures).
60. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO & MORSE, supra note 13, at USA-203 (discussing different discovery policies of Hague Convention signatories as causes of dispute with regard to extraterritorial evidence gathering).
61. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, 847 U.N.T.S. at
245. "A contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare
that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery documents as known in Common Law countries." Id.
62. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIGEST at IC 15-26 (1993). Nations such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Monaco, Spain, and Italy preclude the use of all letters of
request issued under the Hague Convention procedures for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery. Id. Other states, including Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Mexico have also filed reservations under Article 23, declaring that they will
not execute letters rogatory for the purpose of pre-trial discovery. Id.
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relevant data prior to the commencement of the actual trial.6"
Furthermore, the Convention does not address the amount of
judicial supervision necessary to execute an extraterritorial evidence request.' Thus, the Convention does not create a middle
ground between civil law signatories where discovery is controlled by trial judges with little participation from litigants' attorneys, 65 and countries such as the United States where discovery is conducted primarily by parties' lawyers with limited direct
judicial supervision.66
Lastly, the Hague Convention does not set forth specific relevance standards to be adhered to in advancing letters of request. 67 Several signatories, however, have proclaimed that Con-

vention procedures can be utilized to acquire only the information that a judge has determined to be directly relevant to the
substantive issues in dispute.' The United Kingdom has also refused to assist indeterminate disclosure demands that could
merely lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 69 In contrast, the United States permits discovery of any information pertinent to the particular judicial proceeding, as long as it is reasonably calculated to result in the procurement of admissible evidence.70
Signatories are engaged in an ongoing debate over the exclusivity of the Hague Convention as the principal method of
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (3). Rule 26(a)(3) states that a party shall provide to other
parties all relevant information with regard to witnesses, claims, and evidence to be
adduced at trial "at least 30 days before trial." Id.
64. See R1STAU, supra note 44 § 5-1-4, at 167 (discussing ambiguity regarding acts
that fall within functions of judiciary among signatory nations); Hague Convention,
supra note 5 art. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243 (stating that letter of
request may be refused if its execution does not fall within function of judiciary in
signatory requested to produce evidence).
65. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO & MORSE, supra note 13, at USA-203.
66. Id.
67. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2558-59, 847 U.N.T.S. at
241-42. Article 3 provides that the letter of request shall specify "the evidence to be

obtained or other judicial act to be performed." Id. art. 3(d).
68. MCCLEAN, supra note 8, at 99 (discussing reservations filed by signatories to
Hague Convention with regard to Article 23). The United Kingdom included in its
reservation a specific relevance requirement, declaring it would not honor letters of
request that merely require a person to state what documents relevant in the proceeding are within his power to produce. Id.
69. Id. at 99-100.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26 allows for the disclosure of all documents which are
relevant to the proceeding in issue, or which appear reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. Id.
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transnational discovery. 71 The United Kingdom has sustained
the priority of the Convention by incorporating its rules into domestic statutory72 provisions. 78 The United States, however, declined to prescribe recourse to the Hague Convention as a precursor to alternative domestic processes.74 Rather, the U.S.
Supreme Court insisted that the Convention does not limit the
power of federal courts to give precedence to other discovery
techniques authorized by the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.75
C. An Alternative to the Hague Convention: International
Agreements for the Resolution of Interjurisdictional
Discovery Conflicts
The Hague Convention has neither achieved a uniform system of obtaining extraterritorial discovery nor conclusively resolved interjurisdictional discovery disputes. 76 Therefore, several nations enacted blocking legislation 77 designed to frustrate
requests for the disclosure of information in commercial litigation from countries such as the United States.7 8 Confronted
71. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO & MORSE, supra note 13, at USA-204.
72. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (Eng.).
73. See McCrEu, supra note 8, at 105. "[T]he Evidence (Proceedings in Other
jurisdictions) Act of 1975 was enacted to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the
[Hague] Convention." The provisions of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 resemble the rules set forth in the Hague Convention. See id. at 10506 (discussing and comparing provisions of Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 to Hague Convention procedures).
74. Soci& Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522 (1987).
75. Id. at 541-46. The U.S. Supreme Court held that under international comity,
the Hague Convention is merely an undertaking among sovereigns to provide optional,
not mandatory, procedures to facilitate discovery, to which courts should resort when
they deem that course of action appropriate. Id.
76. See STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 210-11 (noting that Hague Convention has not
served as "panacea" for interjurisdictional discovery disputes).
77. See In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 614 n.29 (5th Cir. 1985) (defining
blocking statute as law passed by government imposing penalty upon nationals for complying with foreign court's discovery request).
78. See STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 211. Among countries which have enacted block-

ing legislation are Australia, Bermuda, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Germany, France,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id.;
Gerber, supra note 18, at 548-49 (analyzing non-U.S. blocking statutes enacted in response to broad discovery powers exercised by U.S. courts). See generally A. V. LowE,
ExTRATERUToRuAL JUR1sDICTaON 79-143 (1983)
blocking statutes in English).

(presenting annotated collection of

1995]

EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY

1351

with these barriers to the normal disposition of claims,79 the
United States has responded by negotiating agreements8 ° with
several countries8 ' that provide more elaborate cooperative procedures with regard to obtaining disclosure abroad.82 At present, Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
among the nations that utilize inter-governmental consultation
83
with regard to certain discovery requests.
These agreements have proven useful in furthering general
good will and economic cooperation among nations.8 4 They

have failed, however, to conclusively resolve the dissension over
variant interjurisdictional discovery procedures. 85 One reason
for this impasse is that domestic courts still serve as the unilateral
interpreters of these treaties.8 6 Furthermore, these pacts are, in
79. See Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987), quoting RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) § 437(1) (c) rep. n.5, at 4142 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (approved May 14, 1986). The American Law Institute has
summarized this interplay of blocking statutes and discovery orders:
[W]hen a state has jurisdiction to prescribe and its courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate, adjudication should (subject to generally applicable rules of evidence) take place on the basis of the best information available.... [Blocking] statutes that frustrate this goal need not be given the same deference by
courts of the United States as substantive rules of law at variance with the law
of the United States .... On the other hand, the degree of friction created by
discovery requests . . . and the differing perceptions of the acceptability of
American-style discovery under national and international law, suggest some
efforts to moderate the application abroad of U.S. procedural techniques,
consistent with the overall principle of reasonableness in the exercise ofjurisdiction.
Id.
80. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 28, 23 U.S.T. at 2570, 847 U.N.T.S. at
246. Article 28 of the Hague Convention itself authorized signatories to enter into
collateral agreements limiting or elaborating upon the procedures set forth in the text
of the Convention. Id.
81. See STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 211 (setting forth agreements for cooperation in

discovery conflicts).
82. See Marian Nash, JudicialAssistance, 86 Am.J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1992) (discussing mutual legal assistance treaties as agreements intended to enable law enforcement
authorities to obtain evidence abroad).
83. STEPHAN, supra note 6, at 211.
84. Id. The utility of the agreements surpasses the resolution of discovery conflicts, even though they play their biggest role in this area. Id.
85. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The InternationalDimension of Competition Policy, 17
FoanH.At INT'L L.J. 833, 834 (1994) (discussing questionable success of agreements for
cooperation in international discovery, as evidenced by fact that conflicts still occur).
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 326(2). "Courts in the United States have final
authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it as law in
the United States, but will give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive
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large part, merely agreements to cooperate,8 7 setting forth desirable, but not mandatory rules of conduct.8 8 Consequently, the
agreements are sometimes bypassed in favor of other governmental needs, 89 or side-stepped in order to avoid burdensome
diplomatic processes.9" The evasion of these accords, however,
fosters animosity among nations, and undermines the good will
the pacts were intended to create. 91
II. THE U.S. AND BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON
EXTRATERRITORJAL DISCOVERY
The United States has formulated its procedural laws based
Branch." Id.; see also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 14, at 105 (discussing how differ-

ences between methods of interpretation employed by U.S. courts, such as looking
outside instrument to determine its meaning, may lead them to accord meaning to
treaties different from what non-U.S. tribunals would derive).
87. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.IAS. No. 8291 [hereinafter U.S. - Germany Agreement]. Article 2 imposes an obligation of cooperation in antitrust matters between the
United States and Germany. Id. art. 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1957-58, T.I.A.S. No. 8291 at 2-3.
This cooperation is not defined by the rest of the agreement's text, however, and,
rather than being mandatory, is conditioned upon each party's public policy and national interests. Id. art. 3(1)(b), 27 U.S.T. at 1958, T.IAS. No. 8291 at 3.
88. See U.S. - Germany Agreement, supra note 87, art. 3, 27 U.S.T at 1958, T.I.A.S.
No. 8291 at 3 (conditioning cooperation in antitrust conflicts on individual state policies and national interests). But see CARTER & TiMBLE, supra note 14, at 86-87 (discussing treaties in context of international law). Even though these agreements may not
impose legally binding rules of conduct, they may still carry force as "political commitments." Id. at 86. Governments may develop expectations of compliance with political
commitments, invoke them in public debate to marshall support, and even impose
sanctions for their violation. Id.
89. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1076.
90. Id.; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia),
722 F.2d 657 (1983) (appeal from order of contempt issued upon bank for failure to
comply with grand jury subpoena despite agreement between United States and Cayman Islands requiring U.S. government to resort to stipulated procedures for requesting disclosure prior to issuing grand jury subpoena).
91. See AI-rwooD & BREWSTER, supra note 35, § 15.10, at 228. These agreements
preserve the signatories' right to refuse assistance according to local policies. Id. Efforts by U.S. courts to compel discovery without regard to the agreements are viewed as
attempts to circumvent international accords, and may cause antagonism toward U.S.
courts. Id.; see CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 14, at 87 (noting that violation of international agreements justifies victim of that violation using all means permissible under
international law to bring about cessation of that violation and obtain reparation); Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1081 (stating that disputes concerning standards
of discovery that escalate into conflicts of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and self-determination undermine ability of countries to work harmoniously in other economic, political,
and military matters).
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on the notion that liberal discovery92 is a fundamental precept of
judicial proceedings.93 Thus, both the U.S. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure9 4 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law9 5 affirm the power of U.S. courts to issue broad discovery orders, even when the information requested is located
abroad.9 6 U.S. judges have respected their domestic forum's tradition of broad discovery by generating and compelling production of all relevant information within a party's control.9 7 Unlike
the United States, the United Kingdom employs a more restrictive approach, and generally tries to limit the scope of discovery
orders to information located within its borders.9" Furthermore,
British courts are considered more sensitive to other countries'
concerns for confidentiality than their U.S. counterparts.9 9
A. U.S. Statutory and Common Law Precedentsfor Broad
ExtraterritorialDiscovery
Discovery among international litigants in U.S. district
courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 0
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law10 ' sets forth
principles of international law applicable to transnational discov92. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 843. Civil litigation in the United States is based
on the concept that free and open discovery is essential to the equitable adjudication of
disputes. Id. U.S. courts have broad authority to order disclosure even when the information is located abroad. Id.
93. See Radvan, supra note 58, at 1053 (discussing liberal discovery as fundamental
principle of U.S. judicial proceedings).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD).
96. FED. R. Crv. P. 34. Rule 34 requires only that the information requested in
discovery be within the party's possession, custody, or control. Id.. RESTATEMENT
(THID) § 442. Section 442 authorizes courts or agencies of the United States to require persons within their jurisdiction to submit to discovery even if the information or
the person in possession of the information is located abroad. Id.
97. See Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 843 (discussing broad powers of U.S. courts to
compel production of documents within litigants' control).
98. See McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing British courts' sensitivity to position of non-British nations as reason for more restrained use of extraterritorial discovery).
99. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil action where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between... citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." Id.
101. RESTATEMENT' (THIRD).
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In addition, U.S. courts

have unilaterally developed multiple standards to evaluate the
need for ordering extraterritorial discovery and to determine
whether disclosure orders should be enforced through the imposition of sanctions. 0 3 These precepts are predicated on the
principles of good faith, 10 4 comity, 0 5 and a balancing of domestic interests in disclosure versus non-U.S. concerns of confidenti06
ality.1
102. Id. Section 442 deals with the authority of U.S. courts to request disclosure
from international litigants in accordance with established principles of international
law. Id. § 442.
103. FED R. Civ. P. 37. Rule 37 authorizes U.S. courts to impose sanctions upon
litigants who fail to comply with discovery orders. Id.
104. See Soci& Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (dismissal of action with prejudice as sanction for noncompliance with discovery order inappropriate where party attempted in good faith to
produce requested documents). Pursuant to good faith standard established by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Socifti, parties to litigation and non-party targets of civil or criminal investigation in connection with the suit may be required to show that they have
made diligent efforts to comply with a disclosure order, and that they have attempted to
secure a release or waiver of confidentiality from a state which incorporates blocking
legislation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442 cmt. h. Evidence that parties or targets colluded with secrecy jurisdictions in obtaining prohibition against disclosure, or deliberately secreted documents within a state with blocking legislation, may be regarded as
evidence of bad faith and justify imposition of sanctions for non-production. Id.; see
generally Browne, supra note 2, at 1324-27 (discussing analysis used in determination of
good faith).
105. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The doctrine of comity was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1895. Id. It is generally defined as "the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise
binding on the forum." Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In
international legal practice, comity embodies the objectives of "practical convenience
and expediency based on [the] theory that a court that first asserts jurisdiction will not
be interfered with in [the] continuance of its assertion by a court of a foreign jurisdiction unless it is desirable that one give way to the other." Neal v. State, 135 So.2d 891,
895 (1961).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THnRD) § 442 cmt. (c) (discussing consideration of relevant
U.S. and non-U.S. interests in extraterritorial discovery).
In making the necessary determination of foreign interests .... a court or
agency in the United States should take into account not merely a general
policy of the foreign state to resist 'intrusion upon its sovereign interests,' or
to prefer its own system of litigation, but whether producing the requested
information would affect important substantive policies or interests of the foreign state. In making this determination, the court or agency will look, inter
alia, to expressions of interests by the foreign state, as contrasted with expressions by the paries; to the significance of disclosure in the regulation by the
foreign state of the activity in question; and to indications of the foreign state's
concern for confidentiality prior to the controversy in connection with which
the information is sought.
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1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Should a party to litigation in the United States fail to make
voluntary discovery of all relevant documents, 10 7 his opponent
may petition the court to issue a discovery order. 08 While a
showing of good cause is no longer required to trigger the obligation of voluntary discovery, 10 9 a showing of need is necessary
to move the court to order production of trial evidence. 1 0 Once
the applicant demonstrates a need for the production of relevant information, the court must decide whether to issue a discovery order and, should the ordered party fail to comply,
whether to enforce it through sanctions under Rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' The nationality of the party
Id.
107. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1) (b). "[A] party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties... all documents . . . in the possession, custody, or
control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings." Id.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). "A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all
persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or discovery."
Id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amd. (showing of good
cause no longer required for discovery of documents).
110. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amd., advisory committee's notes to 1980 amendment (judges encouraged to curtail needless discovery).
111. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b) (Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending).
If a party or... agent of a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery .... the court in which the action is pending may make such orders
in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination. In lieu of any of the
foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party
failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
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requested to produce is irrelevant as long as the court can establish personal jurisdiction over the entity through the effects
test I 2 or the conduct analysis."13 Furthermore, the court's
broad authority to order disclosure is resolute regardless of the
location of the documents requested, provided that the informa14
tion is under the litigant's control.'
The scope of discovery authorized by the U.S. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure has often been criticized by non-U.S.
courts.1 1 5 In particular, the relevance requirement stated in
Rule 26116 was denounced by at least one non-U.S.judge" 7 as an
incentive for overbroad disclosure requests by U.S. litigants." 8
One commentator has also hinted that U.S. litigants may take
advantage of the liberal discovery authorized by the Federal
112. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.) rev'd with respect to holding on merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v.
Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (effect in United States of conduct occurring abroad
confers personal jurisdiction upon U.S. courts over perpetrator of that conduct).
113. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34
(2d Cir. 1972) (domestic conduct, in nature of substantial representations made in
United States, was sufficient to trigger applicability of U.S. securities laws to transaction
that occurred abroad).
114. See RICHARD L. MARCus ET M.., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 297.
A party to litigation in the United States has been deemed by U.S. courts to be in
control of requested documents even when that party does not possess them itself, but
has influence over the actual possessor of the information. Id.; see Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The defendant airplane
manufacturer was deemed to be in control of the information requested despite the
fact that the documents were in possession of the defendant's British affiliate. Id. Consequently, the court imposed sanctions for non-compliance with discovery upon the
defendant. Id.
115. See Robert B. Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective of the U.S. PrivatePractitioner, 16 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 985, 986 (1984) (discussing non-U.S. criticism of
expansive scope of U.S. discovery procedures).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26 provides for the disclosure of all documents relevant to the subject matter. Id. In addition, Rule 26 states that the information sought
need not be admissible at trial as long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Id.
117. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434,
441-42. "It is plain that [the] principle of discovery has been carried very much farther
in the United States of America than it has been carried in this country." Id. "It seems
to me to be plain enough that. . . questions would not necessarily be restricted to
matters which were relevant in the suit or to produce necessarily what was admissible
evidence, but might be used to lead to a train of inquiry which might itself lead to
relevant material." Id.
118. Id. The court indirectly compared the broad U.S. discovery practices to the
more restrictive U.K system of discovery, which requires that documents must be
clearly specified in the request so as to avoid "fishing expeditions." Id.
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Rules at the cost of foregoing Hague Convention procedures. 1 19
Moreover, dissatisfaction with the wide discovery orders granted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been considered

a reason for the non-cooperation of foreign courts with U.S. production requests, 12 0 1as well as for the promulgation of blocking
12
legislation abroad.

2. Extraterritorial Discovery Under the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the

United States ("Restatement (Third)") 122 presents an authoritative 12 but not binding 24 formulation of the laws and
policies applicable to international discovery.1 2 5 The issuance
of an extraterritorial discovery order according to the Restatement (Third)1 2 6 is an exercise of a U.S. court's jurisdiction 127 to
119. See CHARLEs PLATO, ed., OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION IN

BusINEss
statutory
of more
120.
121.

DIsPUTEs 132 (1988) (noting that although both Hague Convention and U.S.
instruments provide for extraterritorial discovery, litigants may take advantage
liberal U.S. procedures).
Mehren, supra note 115, at 986.
Id.

122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD). The Restatement (Third) is compiled by the Ameri-

can Law Institute, which was organized in 1923 as a non-profit membership association
whose members are selected on the basis of professional standing. Id. at xi. The Institute defines its purpose as the "clarification and simplification of the law and its better
adaptation to social needs." Id. The Restatement (Third) is not an official document
of the United States, but rather the considered opinion of the American Law Institute.
Id. at ix.
123. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1082. The prestige of the American
Law Institute and its writers established the Restatement (Third) as a leading authority
in cases involving the proper scope of extraterritorial discovery. Id.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating that Restatement (Third)
is not official document).
125. REsTATEMENT (TImRD) § 442. Section 442 sets forth principles of international law applicable in a U.S. court's determination of whether to issue and compel
extraterritorial discovery. Id.
126. Id.. Section 442 confirms the authority of a U.S. court to impose an extraterritorial discovery order upon a litigant within its jurisdiction. Id. (1) (a).
127. Id. § 401. International law encompasses three types of jurisdiction:,
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e. to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e. to subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal
proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e. to induce or compel compliance or to
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prescribe 12 8 as well as to enforce 1 29 its procedural rules upon a
non-U.S. litigant. 3 ' Recognizing that the extraterritorial application of one nation's laws can amount to an unwarranted intrusion upon another's sovereignty, 3 1 the Restatement (Third)
moderates the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction across state
borders through a requirement of reasonableness. 13 2 This condition carries over into the relevant discovery provision 3 3 of the
Restatement, advising U.S. courts to temper their enforcement
of production orders that challenge non-U.S. confidentiality
laws.13 4 At the same time, however, Section 442 permits U.S.
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the
courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.
Id.
128. Id. § 402.
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relation of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory, and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
Id.
129. Id. § 431 (1). "A state may employ judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce
or compel compliance or punish non-compliance with its laws or regulations, provided
it has jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with §§ 402 and 403." Id.
130. Id. § 402. Section 402 recognizes the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over conduct
by U.S. nationals both within and outside U.S. territory, as well as conduct by non-U.S.
persons that has an effect within the United States. Id.
131. Id. § 431, introductory n., at 320.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 442 (Requests for Disclosure: Law of the United States).
134. Id. § 442(2).
(2) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state
in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state of
which a prospective witness is a national,
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the person to whom
the order is directed to make a good faith effort to secure permission
from the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of contempt,
dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to comply with the order for
production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of in-
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courts to draw unfavorable inferences toward litigants unable to
produce 5 requested documentation due to legal restraints
1
abroad. 3
In the absence of non-U.S. secrecy statutes, the Restatement
(Third) grants wide powers to domestic courts or agencies to
order13 6 and compel 13 7 extraterritorial discovery.' 3 8 Judges are

encouraged to scrutinize requests for the production of documents located abroad more closely than comparable requests for
information situated within the United States.1 3 9 The relevance
requirement imposed by Section 442,140 however, mirrors that of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 41 Thus, even though the
Restatement (Third) recognizes that it is reasonable to limit extraterritorial discovery to data necessary to the action, 4 2 it does
not restrict a court's power to request disclosure
of information
143
that is not admissible evidence at trial.
The Restatement's status as a leading authority in interjurisformation or of failure to make a good faith effort in accordance with
paragraph (a);
Id.
135. Id.

(c) (A] court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production,
even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort
has been unsuccessful.
Id.
136. Id. § 442.
(1) (a) A court or agency in the United Sates, when authorized by statute or
rule of court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce
documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the
information is outside the United States.
Id.
137. Id.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject the
person to whom the order is directed to sanction, including finding of
contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default judgment, or may
lead to a determination that the facts to which the order was addressed
are as asserted by the opposing party.
Id.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. § 442 cmt a.
Id. § 442.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
RFSTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442 cmt. a.
Id.
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dictional discovery conflicts'" is derived from its recommended
balancing 4 5 of national and procedural interests in determining
whether a court should issue a disclosure order."4 The importance of non-U.S. claims should be based on the relevant substantive policies of the particular state, as well as on its general
interests in sovereignty.' 4 7 Similarly, the significance of U.S
objectives should be assessed according to the relevance of the
requested documents, as well as to the dynamics of international
judicial cooperation.' 4 8
The framework of analysis set forth by the Restatement
(Third) for determining the proper scope of extraterritorial discovery has received wide approval in the U.S. judicial system. 4 9
Questions still remain, however, regarding the ability of U.S.
courts to balance unilaterally the national interests at stake. 5 °
144. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1082 (noting status of Restatement (Third) as leading authority in cases involving questions on proper scope of extraterritorial discovery).
145. See Douglas H. Meal, Governmental Compulsion as a Defense Under United States
and European Community Antitrust Law, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 98-101 (1981)
(noting popularity of balancing approach as means of resolving disclosure conflicts
within context of antitrust litigation).
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(c).
In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information
located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency in the United
States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and the extent to
which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests
of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
Id.
147. Id. § 442 cmt. c.
148. Id.
In making the necessary determination of the interests of the United States
under Subsection (1) (c), the court or agency should take into account not
merely the interest of the prosecuting or investigating agency in the particular
case, but the long-term interests of the United States generally in international
cooperation in law enforcement and judicial assistance, in joint approach to
problems, of common concern, in giving effect to formal or informal international agreements, and in orderly international relations.
Id.
149. See Meal, supra note 145, at 98-101 (noting popularity of Restatement's balancing approach).
150. See Serge April & Jonathan T. Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in
TransactionalLitigation:A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 961,967-68 (1984)
(arguing that extraterritorial discovery contravenes international law because balancing
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At least one U.S. judge has doubted the competence of the judiciary to equitably resolve disclosure disputes through a balancing
analysis.' 51 Given these reservations, several commentators have
deemed the unilateral consideration
of conflicting international
1 52
concerns objectionable.

3. Common Law Precedents Developed by U.S. Courts in
Extraterritorial Discovery Disputes
In international litigation, U.S. courts have had to weigh the
extensive objectives of U.S. discovery against established principles of international law such as territorial sovereignty 153 and
comity. 154

These principles are both predicated on the interna-

tional law principle known as the Act of State Doctrine.' 55 When
evaluating other nations' concerns of confidentiality against U.S.
interests in disclosure, however, domestic courts have found it
difficult
to arrive, unilaterally, at a consistent framework of analy6
sis.

5

approach in context of jurisdictional analysis is tainted by inherent bias of national
courts).
151. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
We are in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regulation or nonregulation to the United States and the United Kingdom. It is the
crucial importance of these policies which has created the conflict. A proclamation by judicial fiat that one interest is less "important" that the other will
not erase a real conflict.
Id.
152. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 860-61 (discussing impossibility of unilateral balancing of vital national interests that are diametrically opposed).
153. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) (defining territorial sovereignty). "[T] he jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.... Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction." Id.
at 136. Thus, the principle of territorial sovereignty confines the exercise of governmental power within the borders of the particular sovereign, where the authority to
prescribe legislative principles is absolute. Id.
154. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (defining comity as deference that
should be. accorded by one government to acts of another government).
155. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The Supreme Court
founded the Act of State Doctrine by stating that "[elvery sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory." Id. at 252.
156. See Teitelbaum, stpranote 3, at 842. The inconsistent approach developed by
U.S. courts faced with the sensitive issue of weighing national and non-U.S. interests in
discovery conflicts is representative of a deeper problem, namely that [c] ourts are not
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a. The Good Faith Standard Promulgated by SocitM
Internationalev. Rogers
The most prominent U.S. Supreme Court decision attempting to reconcile domestic and foreign interests into a viable
framework of discovery was Sociiti InternationalepourParticipations
Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.'57 Socigti involved a civil
claim whereby the plaintiff, a Swiss holding company, sued the
U.S. Attorney General pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act 158 ("TWEA") to recover assets seized by the
United States under other provisions of the TWEA.' 59 The U.S.
government moved for an order requiring the plaintiff to make
available for inspection 16 certain Swiss banking records which it
claimed would document the real ownership of the assets in dispute.1 6 1 Soci~t6 failed to comply with the disclosure order, arguing that it lacked control of the requested documents because
applicable Swiss penal and banking law prohibited their production at the risk of criminal sanctions. 1 6 2 Notwithstanding Socit6's claim of impossibility of performance, the federal district
court dismissed the suit on the ground that Swiss law did not
furnish an adequate excuse for claimant's failure to comply with
the production order, 163 and the Court of Appeals affirmed." 6
equipped to balance properly the national interests at stake, and acting unilaterally,
they cannot resolve the underlying conflict between American and foreign law." Id.
157. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
158. Trading With the Enemy Act, Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C.
app. 1191 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). [hereinafter TWEA]. TWEA was passed by the
United States during World War I in order to "define, regulate, and punish trading with
the enemy." Id. Section 9 authorized recovery of seized assets by "[a]ny person not an
enemy or ally of an enemy." TWEA § 9, 40 Stat. at 419, 50 U.S.C. App. at 1206.
159. Soci, 357 U.S. at 198.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit
the party making the request, or someone acting on the requestor's behalf, to
inspect and copy, any designated documents.., or to inspect and copy, test,
or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the
party upon whom the request is served.
Id.
161. 357 U.S. at 200.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 202 (citing Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 441-442 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd sub nom. Soci6t6 Intemationale v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956)).
164. 243 F.2d 254, 255 (1957).
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In addition, recourse to the International Court of Justice 6" was
denied on account of Socit6's failure to avail itself of the fill
assortment of legal remedies provided by the U.S. judicial system. 166
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court confined its opinion
to the narrow issue of whether the district court's dismissal of
the action as a sanction for nonproduction was permissible
under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 7 The

Court unanimously held that such a severe penalty was inappropriate where the party had attempted in good faith to produce
the requested documents. 68 Consequently, the case was remanded to the District Court. 169
The Sociiti decision established that where noncompliance
with a discovery order rests on inability rather than unwilling-

ness, a court must pursue sanctions less extreme than dismissal
165. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,

3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. The International Court of Justice, often
called the ICJ or the World Court, was established by the Charter of the United Nations
in 1945, and designed to be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Id. art.
I, 59 Stat. at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179. The ICJ is composed of 15judges or members, no
two of whom may be nationals of the same state. Id. art. III, 59 Stat. at 1055, 3 Bevans at
1179. The members of the ICJ are elected for nine-year terms. Id. art. 13, 59 Stat. at
1056-57, 3 Bevans at 1181-82. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is based on consent of the
parties. Id. art. 36(1), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186. In addition, nations may
declare that they will submit to compulsory jurisdiction by the ICJ with regard to any
legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international
law, or the existence of any fact that could amount to the breach of an international
obligation. Id. art. 36(2), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186-87. Thejurisdiction of the
ICJ under Article 36(2) is limited to legal disputes. Id. art. 36(2), 59 Stat. 1060, 3 Bevans 1186-87. The ICJ, however, may also accept a case involving a political question, in
which case it must decide that dispute ex aequo et bono. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 903 cmt.
d. Under the ex aequo et bono standard, the ICJ may base its holding upon equity rather
than upon existing legal principles. Id. § 903, rep. n.9. The same ex aequo et bono standard may be applied by the court to legal disputes, provided that the parties acquiesce
to this standard. ICJ Statute, supra, art. 38(2), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187.
166. Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. U.S.A.), 1959 I.CJ. 6 (Mar. 21).
167. 357 U.S. 197.
168. Id. at 211-12. The Court stated:
[P]etitioner's extensive efforts at compliance compel the conclusion on this
record that petitioner's failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by
circumstances within its control. It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal
prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for non-production, and this excuse
is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign
sovereign.
Id. at 211.
169. Id. at 213.
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of a seemingly meritorious suit.17 0 The Court did not, however,
elaborate on the type of sanctions admissible in this context.1 7
Also, dicta intimated that despite the plaintiff's good faith effort
to comply with discovery demands, the district court might still
have justifiably drawn unfavorable inferences toward Soci&,t's
suit so as to determine that the absent information could prejudice its claim.1 7 Furthermore, Sociiti's indication that fear of
criminal prosecution may excuse non-compliance with a discovery order1 73 was deemed by commentators to invite the proliferation of criminally enforced secrecy laws abroad as a means of
inducing U.S. courts to curb disclosure orders that expose litigants to non-U.S. penal sanctions. 174
b. The Pure Comity Approach
Pursuant to Sociiti, some courts interpreted the Supreme
Court's reluctance to dismiss an international case for non-compliance with discovery and its indeterminate standard of sanctions as a motion for deference to non-U.S. secrecy laws.1 75 Consequently, several cases resorted to a pure comity approach 76 in
deciding whether extraterritorial discovery should be compelled. 177 This doctrine centered on maintaining amicable rela170. Id. at 212.
171. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 845.
172. 357 U.S. at 212-13. "This is not to say that petitioner will profit, through its
It may be that in the absence of complete
inability to tender the records called for ....
disclosure by petitioner, the District Court would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner...." Id.
173. Id. at 211.
174. See, e.g., Teitelbaum supra note 3, at 845.
175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that fear of criminal prosecution abroad constitutes excuse for non-compliance with discovery order).
176. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1894) (defining comity as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive orjudicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws").
177. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (upholding
district court's modification of subpoena duces tecum on showing that compliance
would violate Panamanian law); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding
that where party served with subpoena duces tecum was only witness and where evidence could have been secured by letters rogatory, subpoena had to be modified so as
not to require production of documents protected by Canadian law); First National City
Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) (holding that production would not be ordered if compliance violated Panamanian law, but
that such violation was not established).
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tions with non-U.S. trading partners by deferring to their concerns for confidentiality at the cost of proceeding without the
necessary information to equitably adjudicate multinational
178
commercial claims.
In FirstNationalCity Bank of New York v. IRS,17' First National
argued that it could not comply with a discovery order for documents relevant to a pending tax investigation, because the situs
of the information was Panama, where disclosure was prohibited
by law. 8 ° Finding that a potential violation of Panamanian law
had not been conclusively established, the Second Circuit ordered discovery. 1"8 ' The court explicitly asserted, however, that
such order should not issue where a litigant makes a clear show18 2
ing that foreign legislation definitively prohibits disclosure.
The Second Circuit reasserted its comity-oriented perspec8
tive in the context of a corporate litigation in Ings V. Ferguson.1 3
Following its previous holding in First National City Bank v.
IRS, 18 4 the court modified an order requiring production of documents situated in Canada and protected under Canadian secrecy laws. 8 5 The decision evinced a more extensive examination of the relevant non-U.S. prohibition than that undertaken
in First National City Bank v. IRS.' 86 In the interest of sovereignty' 817 and comity, 88 however, the court refused to interpret
the Canadian statute, choosing instead to defer to the Canadian
178. See Teitelbaum supra note 3, at 854 (discussing shortcomings of "pure comity"
approach). "Such deference does not adequately address the need to foster American
substantive law, the potential for expansion of non-disclosure jurisdictions, or the injustice of depriving the requesting party of discovery." Id.
179. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
180. Id. at 617.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 619.
183. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
184. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 498 (1960) (clear showing of
non-U.S. prohibition on disclosure will stay discovery order).
185. 282 F.2d at 152.
186. Id. at 150-52. In First NationalCity Bank v. IRS, the court limited its analysis of
the non-U.S. secrecy statute to a factual inquiry. 271 F.2d at 619. In Ings v. Ferguson,
however, the court not only examined the relevant non-disclosure law, but also consulted and relied upon affidavits provided by Canadian counsel, documenting the prohibition of disclosure under Canadian law. 282 F.2d at 150.
187. 282 F.2d at 151. "Each state ... by the very definition of sovereignty is entited to declare its own national policy with respect to such limitations on the production of records as its lawmakers may choose to enact." Id.
188. Id. at 152. "Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts
dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may cause a
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authorities' ban on disclosure.' 89
Similarly, in In Re Chase Manhattan Bank, 9 ' the Second Circuit again affirmed the modification of a subpoena on grounds
that strict compliance would have resulted in a violation of Panamanian law punishable by a minimal fine.' 9 1 Given the monetary and penal' 92 insignificance of the potential sanction, the
court's decision necessarily rested on the principles behind the
enactment of the Panamanian secrecy law, rather than on the
hardship imposed on Chase Manhattan had production been
compelled. 9 3 The second circuit's comity oriented approach to
extraterritorial discovery disputes'9 4 has been criticized by compromulgation of blocking legislamentators as encouraging the
95
tion by non-U.S. regimes.'
c. The Balancing Approach and the Restatement
Factor Analysis
The pure comity approach generated difficulties in adjudicating claims without the necessary information.' 9 6 Therefore,
courts developed a more comprehensive system of resolving discovery disputes by balancing the interests of sovereigns in order
to achieve a common ground between the need for disclosure
violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures." Id.
189. Id. Citing First National Citibank v. IRS for the proposition that illegality
abroad justifies quashing a discovery order, the court held that "[w]hether removal of
records from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian law and is better resolved
by Canadian courts." Id.; see First National Citibank v. IRS, 271 F.2d at 619.
190. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
191. Id. at 613. The fine imposed by Panamanian law was no more than 100 Balboas, equivalent to US$100. Id.
192. Id. at 613. The violation itself was equal to a misdemeanor under U.S. criminal law. Id.
193. Id. at 613. The court refused to decide whether non-U.S. sanctions for disclosure need be of a criminal nature to excuse non-compliance with a discovery decree.
Id. Instead, the court focused on Panama's right to regulate businesses operating
within its borders, and stated: "Just as we would expect and require branches of foreign
banks to abide by our laws applicable to the conduct of their business in this country, so
should we honor their laws affecting our bank branches which are permitted to do
business in foreign countries." Id.
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing comity as reason for
deference to non-U.S. secrecy laws).
195. See Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 855 (criticizing pure comity approach as encouraging spread of blocking legislation at cost of undermining U.S. substantive law).
196. Id. at 856 (discussing problems of adjudicating claims based on strict comity
standard and resulting absence of vital information).
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and concerns of confidentiality. 9 7 The Second Circuit was the
first to undertake this extensive analysis in United States v. First
National City Bank,' 98 which was considered a landmark decision
for U.S. banks with branches or offices in non-U.S. jurisdictions.' 9 9 A federal grand jury investigation into a worldwide quinine cartel involving First National's customers had generated a
subpoena for the production of bank documents from its New
York and Germany offices." ° ° First National refused to comply
with respect to documents situated in Frankfurt, claiming that
disclosure would subject it to civil liability and economic loss in
Germany. 20 1 After analyzing the relevant German law, the district court concluded that the bank would not be subject to criminal sanctions abroad, and that its alleged civil liability was
merely speculative.2 0 2 Consequently, the district court determined that First National had not acted in good faith in refusing
and held the bank and its relevant
to produce the information
203
contempt.
in
personnel
On appeal the court analyzed and balanced the individ2
0
4
and national interests at stake, in accordance with the criual
teria established by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement (Second)").205
197. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing balancing approach
under Restatement (Third)).
198. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
199. Id. at 898.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 897.
202. Id. at 899-900.
203. Id. at 900. The sanctions imposed by the court entailed a fine of US$2000 per
day to be enforced until the bank complied with the requested disclosure and a sentence of a maximum of 60 days imprisonment for the bank's vice president. Id.
204. Id. at 901. The court stated that "a state having jurisdiction to prescribe or
enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because
such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under
the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct." Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39(1)

(1965)) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)].

205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40. Section 40, the precursor to the disclosure provision of the Restatement (Third), set forth the following five factors to balance to
national interests entailed in an extraterritorial discovery conflict:
a) vital national interests of each of the states,
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
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The court stressed the omnipotence of a grand jury subpoena in
the context of U.S. antitrust law, which was considered a cornerstone of U.S. economic policies." 6 Germany's interests in banking secrecy were accorded less weight based on the absence of
criminal penalties for disclosure.2 17 In addition, the court took
the fact that the German government had not expressed a view
on the case as evidence that Germany did not consider its national interests threatened by the requested discovery.20 8 Also,
noting that First National's customers included a New York corporation, the court justified its holding as an attempt to prevent
U.S. businesses from insulating themselves against investigation
by making contracts with banks situated in secrecy jurisdictions. 2 0
Though the Restatement's balancing approach has
emerged as the dominating means of reconciling conflicting national disclosure policies, ° the difficulties of unilaterally weighing diametrically opposed interests soon became apparent.2 1 1 In
In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation2 12 the majority and the dissent each focused on separate factors of the balancing test,21 3 causing them to reach different ded) the nationality of the person, and
e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id. § 40.
206. 396 F.2d at 901-02.
207. Id. at 903.
208. Id. at 904.
209. Id. at 905.
210. See LowE, supra note 78, at xvi (stating that balancing approach dominates
settlement of extraterritorial discovery disputes as means of accommodating conflicting
national legal systems).
211. See The UraniumAntitrust Litigation, comprised of a group of cases arising from
an alleged uranium cartel. Confronted with several secrecy statutes enacted specifically
to frustrate U.S. antitrust law and protect non-U.S. commercial and security interests in
atomic industries, courts could not arrive at a consistent analysis for compelling or withholding extraterritorial discovery orders. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (reversing contempt order
and sanctions because compliance with discovery order would have violated Canadian
law). But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(sustaining discovery order despite illegality of disclosure abroad). See Teitelbaum,
supra note 3, at 860-61 (discussing difficulty in unilateral balancing of diametrically
opposed national interests).
212. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
213. Id. The majority focused on Westinghouse's good faith, determined by the
standard set forth in Sociiti Internationalepour ParticipationsIndustrieles et Commerciales v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 563 F.2d at 996. The dissent concentrated on Canada's
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cisions. 14 The case arose out of a series of contracts whereby
Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse") committed to supply uranium to various U.S. utilities at a fixed price.2 15
When Westinghouse defaulted on its obligations following a
drastic price increase for uranium, the utilities brought a breach
of contract action. 1 6 Upon counterclaiming with an antitrust
suit for an alleged conspiracy to raise the price of uranium, Westinghouse sought extensive discovery abroad in connection to
both its impracticability defense and its antitrust claim. 21 7 Rio
Algom, a U.S. company, refused to comply with a subpoena for
documents situated at its corporate offices in Canada, claiming
that disclosure would subject it to criminal penalties under Canadian law. 21 8 The district court held Rio Algom in contempt and
imposed monetary sanctions, which the court of appeals reversed and vacated. 1 9
The majority in Westinghouse concentrated on balancing the
interests at stake, in accordance with the factor analysis suggested by the Restatement (Second) 22 0 of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States.2 2 ' Finding no evidence of collusion between the company and the Canadian sovereign,
the court
held that Rio Algom had made diligent efforts to comply with
the subpoena by seeking a waiver from the Canadian government.22 3 The court also found that the national interest expressed by Canada in controlling and supervising its atomic industries was superior to the U.S. interest in discovery, especially
since the information sought by Westinghouse was not disposiefforts and purpose to frustrate U.S. discovery orders by enacting secrecy statutes. Id. at
1001.
214. Id. The majority held that Rio Algom's good faith efforts to comply with the
discovery request, defeated only by Canada's secrecy !aws, should weigh against enforcing the discovery order via sanctions. Id. at 999. The dissent favored compulsion
through sanctions as a penalty for Canadi's deliberate subversion of U.S. discovery demands, and refused to consider good faith an excuse for non-compliance. Id. at 100103.
215. Id. at 994.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 994-95.
219. Id. at 995.
220. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) § 40.
221. 563 F.2d at 997.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 998.
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tive in value, but merely cumulative. 2 4
As far as criminal sanctions were concerned, the court cited
Sociit for the proposition that potential penalties abroad do not
constitute a bar to ordering discovery within the United
States. 225 Unlike the dissent, however, which focused on Canada's objectives in enacting the criminal secrecy laws, 6 the majority dealt primarily with Westinghouse's efforts of compliance. 227 Consequently, the Court held that inability to satisfy discovery based on criminal penalties should tilt the scales against
compelling enforcement of the disclosure order through sanctions.228 The dissent, on the other hand, viewed the Canadian
secrecy laws as a deliberate attempt to frustrate discovery in the
present claims, 2 19 and maintained that the sanctions should not
be vacated, but should only be examined and possibly modified
2 30
in light of Rio Algom's diligent effort to comply.
Given the difficulties of unilaterally balancing conflicting
national interests, 2 3 1 some courts reverted to resolving extraterri233
23 2
torial discovery disputes through a comity and territoriality
224. Id. at 998-99.
225. Id. at 997. The court, however, qualified this reasoning by stating that "Sociti
calls for a 'balancing approach' on a case-by-case analysis." Id.
226. Id. at 1001.
227. Id. at 998.
228. Id. at 997.
229. Id. at 1001. In reaching this conclusion, CircuitJudge Doyle examined a variety of documents, previous court opinions and press releases. Id.
230. Id. at 1003.
231. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Judge Wilkey
delivered a thorough criticism of the impropriety and difficulty entailed in a unilateral
balancing analysis by a domestic court:
[T]his approach is unsuitable when courts are forced to choose between a
domestic law which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign law
which is calculated to thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order
to protect foreign interests allegedly threatened by the objectives of the domestic law. Interest balancing in this problem is hobbled by two primary
problems: (1) there are substantial limitations on the court's ability to conduct a neutral balancing of the competing interests, and (2) the adoption of
interest balancing is unlikely to achieve its goal of promoting international
comity.
Id. at 948.
232. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (defining comity as one nation's
recognition of another nation's extraterritorial acts).
233. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defining territoriality as most pervasive principle underlying prescriptive jurisdiction). "The prerogative
of a nation to control and regulate activities within its boundaries is an essential, definitional element of sovereignty." Id. at 921.
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analysis. Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-

Pont-A-Mousson234 circumscribed the power of a U.S. regulatory
agency to serve compulsory process upon a non-U.S. national by
differentiating between prescriptive2 5 and enforcement jurisdiction.23 6 Namely, a subpoena issued by the Federal Trade Com-

mission ("FTC") to be served upon a French corporation via registered mail was viewed as an effort to serve compulsory process
upon an unwilling non-party witness.2 3 7 Because such service is
limited to a sovereign's authority to enforce its laws within its
own borders, the extraterritorial reach of the subpoena was
deemed a transgression upon French sovereignty and a violation
of international law.23 8 The court was careful to preserve the
FTC's right to investigate and regulate all activities affecting U.S.
commerce. 23 9 The court qualified this license, however, through
a disguised comity analysis that warned against liberal judicial
control of government agencies threatening to exercise their
powers extraterritorially. 40 Consequently, enforcement of the
subpoena was vacated.2 4 '
24 2
On the other hand, in Mark Rich and Co. v. United States,
comity was superseded by U.S. territoriality principles.243 Mark
Rich was a Swiss commodities trading corporation that came
under grand jury investigation for an alleged tax evasion scheme
perpetrated upon the U.S. government. 2 " When the company
failed to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued in the course
of the investigation, the court sustained a coercive fine for nonproduction of documents despite the illegality of compliance in
234. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
235. Id. at 1315. Jurisdiction to prescribe was defined by the court as a "state's

authority to enact laws governing the conduct, relations, status, or interests of persons
or things, whether by legislation, executive act or order, or administrative rule or regulation." Id.
236. Id. Jurisdiction to enforce was defined by the court as a "state's authority to
compel compliance or impose sanctions for noncompliance with its administrative or
judicial orders." Id.
237. Id. at 1316.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1322.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
•243. Id. at 666.
244. Id. at 665.
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the country where discovery was sought. 4 5 The opinion justified
the grand jury's authority to query suspect commercial transactions that could bear upon U.S. nationals through a territorial
and protective analysis that excluded any consideration of conflicting non-U.S. law.2 6 Consequently, the court held that given
the illegality of the alleged activities and the detrimental effects
of tax crimes on the U.S. economy, the extraterritorial compul24 7
sion of discovery was reasonable and just.
d. Judicial Treatment of the Hague Convention in U.S.
Extraterritorial Discovery Conflicts
The extent, if any, to which the discovery procedures set
forth in Hague Convention2 48 supplanted those established by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 4 9 was a common theme in
extraterritorial discovery disputes.2 5 ° In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan
American World Airways 5 1 the court quashed a subpoena served
on two English banks at their New York offices requiring them to
produce documents held in London relating to transactions that
took place in the United Kingdom. 52 The decision depicted the
court's effort to comply with international procedures of discovery by condemning the service of subpoenas in New York as a
transparent attempt to circumvent the Hague Convention. 5 3 In
addition, the court recognized the controversy of extraterritorial
jurisdiction granted by U.S. antitrust law, particularly as it relates
to non-U.S. third-party witnesses and their conduct abroad.2 5 4
245. Id. at 670. The court held Mark Rich Co. in civil contempt and sustained a

coercive fine of US$50,000 per day pending compliance with the discovery order. Id.
246. Id. at 666.

The territorial principle is applicable when acts outside a jurisdiction are intended to produce and do produce detrimental effects within it. Under the
protective principle, a state "has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens ... the

operation of its governmental functions .... "
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 33).
247. 707 F.2d at 666.
248. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 5, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
249. See supra notes 107-21 (discussing discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
250. McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 107.
251. 607 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
252. Id. at 325.
253. Id. at 326.
254. Id. at 327.
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Although this opinion did not undertake an in-depth analysis of
the conflicting national interests at stake, nor establish an order
of precedence between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Hague Convention, it was viewed by English courts as a wel2 55
come revival of sensitivity to non-U.S. sovereign interests.
Deference to the Hague Convention as a means of uniform
procedural treatment in extraterritorial discovery was nearly extinguished by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in SociitiNationale IndustrieleAgrospatiale v. United States.256 The plaintiffs in Arospatiale were U.S. citizens who sustained injuries in a plane
crash in Iowa.2 57 They sued the manufacturer of the airplane,
Aerospatiale, a French corporation wholly owned by the government of France. 25 8 When a second set of extensive discovery requests were served upon it, Adrospatiale refused to comply with
respect to documents situated in France, arguing that Hague
Convention procedures should take precedence over any U.S.
disclosure methods. 9
Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court held in a five-to-four
opinion that recourse to the Hague Convention was not
mandatory. 26 ° Rather, domestic discovery procedures could be
255. MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., [1986] 1 All
E.R. 653, 660.
256. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). Prior to Arospatiale, other courts also held that the
Hague Convention does not modify, restrict or replace the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other accepted means of discovery in U.S. litigation. See Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F.Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that Hague Convention
provides permissive but not mandatory procedures of discovery, based on Article 27 of
Hague Convention). Article 27 allows states to utilize domestic methods of discovery
other than those provided for in the text of the Hague Convention. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at 2569, 847 U.N.T.S. at 246; see Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 81 Civ.
4463 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1983) (holding that goal of Hague Convention is to increase
exchange of information between nations, not to frustrate domestic discovery process);
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that application of Hague Convention procedures is within discretion
of court, and does not preclude discovery according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Guy M. Struve, Discovery From ForeignPartiesin Civil Cases Before U.S. Courts,
16 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 1101, 1109-13 (1984) (discussing judicial curtailment of
Hague Convention).
257. 482 U.S. at 524.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 527.
260. Id. at 539. The majority supported its decision by an analysis of the control
necessarily exerted by domestic courts over inherent procedural aspects of U.S. litigation, and stated:
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used in place of the Hague Convention to obtain information
located outside the United States."' The decision did undertake in-depth considerations of comity and fairness to litigants. 62 In a close majority, however, the court found that comity did not mandate initial resort to Hague Convention
processes, unless prior scrutiny of the particular facts and sovereign interests in each case provided a likelihood that recourse to
the Convention would be more effective.23 s The Court also
stated that blocking legislation should not be viewed as a bar to
discovery demands, but should only be considered in identifying
the nature of a sovereign's interest in nondisclosure of certain
information.2
Arospatiale did not indicate whether litigants favoring the
use of Hague Convention procedures should bear the burden of
satisfying the proposed balancing test,265 or whether Convention
2 66
opponents should prove the impracticability of the request.
An interpretation of the Hague Convention as the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively subject every American
court hearing a case involving a national of a contracting state to the internal
laws of that State. Interrogatories and document requests are staples of international commercial litigation, no less than of other suits, yet a rule of exclusivity would subordinate the court's supervision of even the most routine of
these pre-trial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of foreign judicial authorities.
Id.
261. Id. at 542. According to the court, the Hague Convention itself neither stated
nor implied that it was the exclusive means of obtaining foreign information, and no
other basis existed for imposing such an obligation. Id. at 540.
262. Id. at 542.
263. Id. at 544. The court set up what later decisions termed a three-prong test for
determining whether recourse to the Hague Convention should take precedence over
domestic methods of discovery, based on: (1) the particular facts of the case, (2) sovereign interests, and (3) likelihood that resort to Hague Convention procedures will
prove effective. Id.
264. Id.; see Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir.
1992) (heieinafter "Ridhmark"). Relying on Adrospatiale's dismissal of blocking legislation as ban to discovery, the court upheld fines of contempt for a Chinese company's
failure to supply financial information necessary to satisfy ajudgment against it in the
United States, despite illegality of disclosure abroad. Id.
265. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (stating prongs of Afrospatiale balancing test).
266. SeeJoseph P. Griffin & Mark N. Bravin, Beyond Airospatiale: A Commentary on
Foreign Discovey Provisions of the Restatement (Third) and the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER: COMMENTARIES ON THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 80

(1992) (surveying implementation of vague Ahrspatiale precedent). "The majority
opinion in Abrspatiak is not clear as to whether the proponent of the [Hague Conven-
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Although post-A rospatialedecisions have consistently placed the
burden on the party advocating recourse to Hague Convention
procedures,2 67 they have accorded varying degrees of significance to the individual prongs2 68 of the Agrospatialetest.2 69 Ques-

tions remain with respect to the utility of Aerospatiale'sbalancing
criteria, 270 as well as regarding the priority of the Hague Convention over the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 71
B. Statutoiy and Common Law PrecedentsDeveloped by the United
Kingdom for Resolving Interjurisdictional
Discovery Disputes

The British equivalent to the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure272 are the Rules of the Supreme Court.275 The scope of
discovery permitted under U.K. regulations, however, is more
limited than that allowed in the United States.2 74 Extraterritorial
discovery is similarly curtailed by the British Protection of Trading Interests Act. 275 In addition, U.K. courts embroiled in intejurisdictional discovery disputes place more emphasis on comity and non-U.K concerns for confidentiality than their U.S.
counterparts.276
tion] or the proponent of the FRCP should bear the burden for proving that its method
should be used for foreign discovery." Id. at 80.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (setting forth three-prong test established by Airospatialefor determining whether Hague Convention should take precedence over domestic methods of discovery).

269. See Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.NJ. 1987). A
specific declaration by the Swedish government stating that Hague Convention proce-

dures comport with Swiss policies more so than the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not considered to express a sovereign interest strong enough to satisfy the
second prong of the Aerospatiale test. Id. at 391. But see In re Perrier Bottled Water
Litigation, 138 F.R.D. 348 (D.Ct. 1991). France's general disfavor with the U.S. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and its adoption of the Hague Convention were held to manifest enough of a sovereign interest in the implementation of Hague discovery procedures to fulfill the second prong of the Awrospatiale test. Id. at 354-55.
270. Griffin & Bravin, supra note 266, at 84.
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
273. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r. 1-3 (Eng.).
274. McCIEAN, supra note 8, at 72.

275. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 (Eng.).
276. See McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 59 (stating that British courts are more sensitive
to non-U.K concerns of confidentiality, leading to more restrained use of extraterritorial procedural jurisdiction).
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1. Discovery Under the U.K. Rules of the Supreme Court
Discovery in U.K. courts proceeds under the Rules of the
Supreme Court.2 7 7 At the close of the pleadings, litigants may
request discovery of all relevant documentation within the parties' possession or power to produce.27 8 The duty to engage in
discovery is limited to actual parties to the action.2 7 9 This obliga28 0
tion does not arise until the pleadings have been completed,
so as to limit production requests to information directly relevant to issues on trial. 8 1 Should the parties fail to honor production demands, the court may issue an order for compliance
under Rule 3 of Order 24.282
By making completion of the pleadings a condition to dis277. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.1-3 (Eng.).
278. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.2 (Eng.).
Discovery by parties without order. (1) Subject to the provisions of this rule
and of rule 4, the parties to an action between whom pleadings are closed
must make discovery by exchanging lists of documents, and, accordingly, each
party must, within 14 days after the pleadings in the action are deemed to be
closed as between him and any other party, make and serve on that other party
a list of the documents which are or have been in his possession, custody or
power relating to any matter in question between them in the action.
Id.
279. Id. "[T]his paragraph shall not apply in third party proceedings, including
proceedings under that Order involving fourth or subsequent parties." Id.; see Plummer v. May, [1750] 1 Ves. Sen. 426, 27 E.R. 1121 (holding that it would be "very mischievous" to seek to make one who was merely a wimess a party in order to obtain
discovery).
280. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.2 (Eng.).
281. See McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 60 (noting delayed discovery in U.I courts as
means to prevent overly broad disclosure requests engendered by fragmentary pleadings).
282. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.3 (Eng.).
Order for Discovery.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this rule and of rules 4 and 8, the Court may
order any party to a cause or matter.., to make and serve on any other party a
list of the documents which are or have been in his possession, custody or
power relating to any matter in question in the cause or matter, and may at
the same time or subsequently also order him to make and file an affidavit
verifying such a list and to serve a copy thereof on the other party.
(2) Where a party who is required by rule 2 to make discovery of document
fails to comply with any provision of that rule, the Court, o the application of
any party to whom the discovery was required to be made, may make an order
against the first-mentioned party under paragraph (1) of this rule or, as the
case may be, may order him to make and file an affidavit verifying the list of
documents he is'required to make under rule 2 and to serve a copy thereof on

the applicant.
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covery, 183 the United Kingdom has also limited the scope of voluntary pre-trial discovery. 84 Order 38, however, permits a court
to issue a disclosure decree at proceedings other than a trial,285
but limits that exercise to information that would be admissible
at the actual hearing. 286 Furthermore, a court must constrain its
power to order disclosure to documents that are clearly specified
in the party's request for discovery. 87
The U.K. practice of issuing extraterritorial discovery decrees is a product of case law, as well as of the Rules of the
Supreme Court. 288 Order 38 authorizes such decrees to be
made where necessary for the purposes ofjustice.

89

British case

law, however, has established that the issuance of such orders lies
primarily within the discretion of the courts. 90
2. U.K. Statutory Treatment of Extraterritorial Discovery
The United Kingdom's aversion toward the extraterritorial
exercise of procedural jurisdiction has been prompted in response to the broad discovery exerted by U.S. courts," 1 and criticized by U.K. judges as a transgression upon the sovereignty of
1 The Protection of Trading Interests Act
other nations. 2 92
of
283. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.2 (Eng.).
284. Id. The obligation to engage in discovery is limited to "parties to an action
between whom pleadings are closed." Id. Thus, there is no obligation to participate in
pre-trial disclosure. Id.
285. R.S.C. Ord. 38 (Eng.).
Order to produce document at proceeding other than trial.
(1) At any stage in a cause or matter the Court may order any person to attend any proceeding in the cause or matter and produce any document, to be
specified or described in the order, the production of which appears to the
Court to be necessary for the purpose of that proceeding.
Id.
286. R.S.C. Ord. 38 (Eng.). "(2) No person shall be compelled by an order under
paragraph (1) to produce any document at a proceeding in a cause or matter which he
could not be compelled to produce at the trial of that cause or matter." Id.
287. R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.2 (Eng.). Upon application by a party, a court may order
discovery "of such documents or classes of-document only, or as to such only of the
matters in question, as may be specified in the order." Id.
288. See McCiAN, supra note 8, at 75 (discussing practice of U.K. courts in taking
evidence abroad).
289. R.S.C. Ord. 38 r.1 (Eng.).
290. McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 75.
291. See 973 H.C. DEES. cols. 1533-41 (Nov. 1979), reprinted in Barr. Y.B. IrNr'L L.
358 (denouncing as objectionable powers possessed by U.S. agencies authorizing extraterritorial investigations and proceedings against individuals outside their jurisdiction).
292. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434
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1980 ("PTIA")2 9 3 authorizes the Secretary of State to reject any
measures sought to be imposed upon a British national by another state with regard to conduct that occurred in the United
Kingdom. 294 Furthermore, the PTIA authorizes British courts to
deny non-U.K, requests for disclosure of evidence, which infringe upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.295

The PTIA also empowers the Secretary of State to prohibit
compliance by British nationals with disclosure requests2 9 6 that
(holding wide extraterritorial investigatory procedures practiced in U.S. litigation as
transgression upon sovereignty of United Kingdom).
293. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (Eng.).
(1) If it appears to the Secretary of State (a) that measures have been or are proposed to be taken by or under the
law of any overseas country for regulating or controlling international trade;
and
(b) that those measures, in so far as they apply or would apply to things
done or to be done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country by persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or threaten
to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom ....
(3) The Secretary of State may give to any person in the United Kingdom
who carries on business there such directions for prohibiting compliance with
any such requirement or prohibition as aforesaid as he considers appropriate
for avoiding damage to the trading interests of the United Kingdom.
Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. § 4 (Restriction of Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975).
A court in the United Kingdom shall not make an order under section 2 of the
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 for giving effect to a
request issued by or on behalf of a court or tribunal of an overseas country if it
is shown that the request infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or
is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; and a certificate signed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State to the effect that it infringes that jurisdiction or is so prejudicial shall be conclusive evidence of that
fact.
Id.
296. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 § 2.
(1) If it appears to the Secretary of State(a) that a requirement has been or may be imposed on a person or persons in
the United Kingdom to produce to any court, tribunal or authority of an overseas country any commercial document which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of that country or to furnish any commercial information to any such
court, tribunal or authority .... the Secretary of State may, if it appears to him
that the requirement is inadmissible by virtue of subsection (2) or (3) below,
give directions for prohibiting compliance with that requirement.
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threaten the security of the United Kingdom 9 7 or are prejudicial to its sovereignty. 298 Preserving the traditional U.K. bar on
pre-trial discovery, the PTIA enables the Secretary of State to declare a non-U.K, disclosure request inadmissible if made for purposes other than a trial commenced abroad. 29 The PTIA also
incorporates the specificity standard included in the Rules of the

Supreme Court 3 ° by making a request for indeterminate information similarly inadmissible. 0 1
In addition to the PTIA, the Evidence (Proceedings in
Other Jurisdiction) Act of 197502 ("Evidence Act of 1975") imposes similar restraints on discovery,30 3 particularly where disclo-

sure is likely to expose British nationals to penalties or claims
abroad. 30 4 Although its text does not mention the Hague Con297. Id. The Secretary of State may prohibit compliance with any requirement
that "would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom or to the relations of
the government of the United Kingdom with the government of any other country." Id.
298. Id. Compliance with a discovery request may be prohibited by the Secretary
of State if the request "infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise
prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom." Id.
299. Id. "A requirement.., is also inadmissible - if it is made otherwise than for
the purpose of civil or criminal proceedings which have been instituted in the overseas
country." Id.
300. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing specificity requirement
of R.S.C. Ord. 24 r.2 (Eng.)).
301. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 § 2. A request for discovery is inadmissible "if it requires a person to state what documents relevant to any such proceedings are or have been in his possession, custody or power or to produce for the purpose
of any such proceedings any documents other than particular documents specified in
the requirement." Id.
302. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (Eng.) [hereinafter
Evidence Act of 1975].
303. See, e.g., Civil (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Evidence Act of 1975
§ 2(4) (Eng.) (imposing requirement of specificity in discovery requests, similar to
PTIA and R.S.C. (Eng.) specificity requirements).
(4) An order under this section shall not require a person
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the application for the order relates are or have been in his possession, custody or power;
or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in
the order as being documents appearing to the court making the order to be,
or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody or power.
Id.
304. Id. § 3.
(1) A person shall not be compelled by virtue of an order under section 2
above to give any evidence which he could not be compelled to give
(a) in civil proceedings in the part of the United Kingdom in which the court
that made the order exercises jurisdiction; or
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vention, the Evidence Act of 1975 was actually passed so as to
enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention. °5 In fact,
the text of the Evidence Act of 1975 resembles the provisions of
the Hague Convention, especially with regard to measures available to compel disclosure. 0 6 Furthermore, the specificity requirement contained by Section 2(4) the Evidence Act of
1975307 constitutes the statutory equivalent of reservations filed
by the9 United Kingdom 3 0 8 upon signing the Hague Conven0
tion.
3. Common Law Precedents Developed by U.K. Courts in
Extraterritorial Discovery Disputes
British courts have grappled with the same issues facing U.S.
courts with regard to discovery in transnational litigation. 1 0 Unlike the United States, which takes the offensive in compelling
extraterritorial disclosure, the United Kingdom has traditionally
employed a defensive approach in limiting the scope of discovery orders to conduct within its borders.3 1 The specific balancing analysis undertaken by U.S. courts has been explicitly re(b) subject to subsection (2) below, in civil proceedings in the country or
territory in which the requesting court exercises jurisdiction.
Id.; see Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434
(section 3(1)(b) of Evidence Act of 1975 used successfully to invoke 5th Amendment
privilege against disclosure in United States).
305. MCCLEAN, supra note 8, at 105.
306. Evidence Act of 1975 § 3. "An order under this section shall not require any
particular steps to be taken unless they are steps which can be required to be taken by
way of obtaining evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the court making the
order." Id.; compare with the Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 10, 23 U.S.T. at 256162, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
In executing a Letter of Request the requested authority shall apply the appropriate measures of compulsion in the instanc'es and to the same extent as are
provided by its internal law for the execution of orders issued by the authorities of its own country or of requests made by parties in internal proceedings.
Id.
307. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (stating specificity requirement imposed by Evidence Act of 1975).
308. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing reservations under
Article 23 of Hague Convention and listing signatories, including United Kingdom, that
filed such reservations).
309. Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 455.
310. See McCLAN, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing British practice of discovery)..
311. Id. "[English courts] retain... a proper sensitivity to the position of foreign
countries, and exercise their discretion with that in mind. The result is a much more
restrained use of orders with extra-territorial effects than is the practice in the United
States." Id.
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jected by the United Kingdom as an impossible task that invariably results in prejudice to foreign litigants.31 2 Instead, British
3 14
decisions focus on comity313 and fairness to litigants.
a. The Strict U.K. Requirement of Specificity
One of the most prominent British decisions with respect to
extraterritorial discovery was Rio Tinto Zinc Corporationv. Westinghouse Electric Corp.3 15 Westinghouse, a U.S. company, was the defendant in a mass litigation in the United States concerning its
breach of contract for the supply of uranium to various utility
companies. 3 1 6 In support of its defense of commercial impracticability arising from an alleged uranium producers' cartel, Westinghouse issued letters rogatory to the High Court of Justice in
England." 7 These requests sought to procure the testimony of
various employees 3 18 of the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation ("RTZ"),
as well as associated documents on the'existence of the alleged
cartel.3 19 The RTZ companies claimed privilege against production of nearly all the scheduled documents on grounds that it
would expose them to proceedings for the recovery of a penalty
under Section 14 of the Civil Evidence Act of 1968.2' Faced
with the possibility of subjecting British nationals to potential domestic liabilities, as well as antitrust penalties in the United
States, the High Court dismissed the letters rogatory.3 2 ' Further312. See MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lufkin &Jenrette Securities Corp., [1986] All
E.R. 653, 662 (noting potential for domestic favoritism in weighing foreign policies
against national interests of sovereignty).
313. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (defining concept of comity).
314. See, e.g., Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 367, aff'd,
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L.). In deciding whether to order a British company to produce documents kept by its subsidiary abroad in a secrecy jurisdiction, the court considered the likelihood of success and the burden imposed on the company should it be
compelled to pursue disclosure. Id.
315. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434.
316. Id. at 434; see supra notes 211-30 and accompanying text (discussing Uranium
Antitrust Litigation in U.S. courts).
317. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 435.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320, Id. at 436. Section 14 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 provided for "[ t ] he right
of a person in any legal proceedings other than criminal proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing if to do so would tend to expose
that person to proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty." Civil Evidence Act 1968 § 14(1) (Eng.).
321. Rio Tinto Zinc, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 478.
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more, the court denounced the broad extraterritorial investigatory procedures employed in U.S. antitrust legislation as an infringement upon the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. 22
The opinions also criticized the low relevance and specificity standards permitted in U.S. extraterritorial discovery, particularly in the context of pre-trial disclosure orders addressed to
non-party litigants. 3 23 Consequently, the court sustained a rigid
requirement of specificity that limited compliance to those
records stipulated in the discovery request.3 24 These qualifications mandated strict judicial construction of non-U.K orders
for disclosure addressed to non-party witnesses,32 5 so as to discourage fishing expeditions.126 Should letters rogatory fail to
clearly identify the information demanded, the court indicated
that they might employ a blue pencil3 2 approach, giving effect
solely to those portions of the request that adhere to the above
conditions.32 8 The judges, however, declined to become the selfappointed editors of petitions that are so far-reaching in scope as
to justify their overall rejection. 2 9
322. Id. at 448 (quoting notice of intervention by Her Majesty's Attorney-General
on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom). "Her majesty's government
considers that the wide investigatory procedures under the United States antitrust legislation against persons outside the United States who are not United States citizens constitute an infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United Kingdom." Id.
323. Id. at 452. The court noted that U.S. discovery proceeds on a much wider
basis then permitted in the United Kingdom, especially with regard to pre-trial and
non-party discovery. Id. The court then chastised the lack of attention given by the
respondents to the differences inherent between the U.K. and U.S. system, particularly
with regard to the distinction between "the obtaining of evidence in the strict sense and
the obtaining of information which might lead to the obtaining of evidence." Id.
324. Id. at 442.
325. Id.
326. Id. The court noted that the Evidence Act of 1975 called for production of
"particular documents specified in the order." Id. This language had evolved from an
earlier evidence act, which merely called for discovery of "documents to be mentioned
in the order." Id. The Court took this change as indicative of a higher degree of specificity necessary to grant a discovery request, instead of a mere blanket disclosure order,
or a "fishing expedition." Id.
327. Id. at 443. The Court of Appeals had deleted parts of the request, and replaced the words "relating thereto" with the more specific "referred to therein." Id.
Lord Wilberforce referred to this editing as applying a "blue pencil." Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 444.
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b. British Deference to Secrecy Concerns of
Foreign Jurisdictions
In addition to the protectionist ideologies that characterize
many British decisions in extraterritorial discovery disputes, the
United Kingdom has also shown respect for other sovereigns'
confidentiality concerns. 33 0 Thus, U.K. courts have refrained
from compelling disclosure by companies operating in secrecy
jurisdictions or in nations that otherwise reject the open exchange of commercial information. 3 3 ' Unlike U.S. courts, British judges also temper their production orders based on the likelihood of success in obtaining the information requested,3 32 as
33
well as on the significance of that data in the particular suit. 3
The decision in Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd.3 3 4 defined the standard for determining whether documents are
within a litigant's power to disclose in the context of a multinational corporation and its foreign subsidiaries.3 35 Lonrho was
the owner of an oil pipeline running from Mozambique to Rhodesia. 36 It brought a suit against the defendant oil companies,
claiming damages arising from non-use of the pipeline based on
the defendants' covert supply of petroleum to Rhodesia.3 3 7 The
Shell companies failed to comply with plaintiff's discovery requests, claiming that they lacked control over the respective
records, which were held at their subsidiaries in South Africa. 3
The actual subsidiary directors had also refused to produce the
documents on grounds that they would be held criminally liable
330. McCL.AN supra note 8, at 59.
331. See MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lufkin &Jenrette Securities Corp., [1986] 1 All
E.R. 653, 660 (noting international law right of state to regulate conduct of its nationals
even outside its jurisdiction, provided such regulation does not involve disobedience to
local law).
332. See Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum (C.A.), [1980] 2 W.L.R. 367, 376. Docu-

ments are to be disclosed only if they are in the immediate power of the party requested
to produce them. Id. Where the parties requested to produce discovery had to take
additional steps to secure the information, without guarantee of success, the discovery
order was not sustained. Id.
333. Id. Documents are to be disclosed only if they are important in the present

claim, or are necessary to save costs. Id.
334. [1980] 2 W.L.R. 367, aff'd, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L).
335. Id. at 369.

336. Id. at 367.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 370.
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9
in local proceedings for divulging confidential information.33
The plaintiffs, however, contended that the defendants did have
control of the records in question by reason of their ownership
of the subsidiaries, and that their refusal to produce was in bad
faith.M0
The court excused Shell Petroleum's non-compliance, holding that the documents were not under its immediate control. 4 1
Before requiring the defendants to take radical steps toward production, the justices evaluated the burden imposed on them
based on the likelihood of success in obtaining disclosure. 4 2
The only way to surmount the subsidiary directors' autonomy in
refusing production was to fire them or to alter the charters of
the companies. 43 Neither route, however, was certain to result
in compliance with the discovery requests, as new directors
would still owe their primary loyalty to the subsidiaries, requiring
them to resist disclosure and shield the firms from criminal prosecution." Before deferring to the subsidiaries' penal concerns,
however, the judges ensured that the enterprises were legitimate
businesses, rather than sham organizations used to conceal commercial information against judicial discovery orders. 45 Furthermore, the court examined the relevance of the requested
information to the adjudication of the underlying claim. 34 6 After finding the particular data to be cumulative rather
than dis3 47
positive in nature, the court dismissed the appeal.

The deference to local jurisdictional concerns espoused by
the Lonrho court is a recurring theme in the United Kingdom's
settlement of extraterritorial discovery disputes, particularly in
339. Id.
340. Id. at 372.
341. Id. at 376.
342. Id. at 377. The court considered the steps Lonrho would have had to take to
obtain the information, such as firing the directors and altering the articles of incorporation of the subsidiaries, an "affront on the persona of the company itself." Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 373. The court commissioned a thorough investigation of the subsidiaries to ascertain that they were indeed legitimate businesses, rather than mere sham
organizations designed to circumvent disclosure laws. Id.
346. Id, at 376. "Documents are only to be disclosed if they are necessary for fairly
disposing of the matter or for saving costs." Id.
347. Id. at 379.
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the context of international banking M 8 In R. v. GrossmanM9 the
court of appeal set aside an order for disclosure directed toward
a British bank operating in the Isle of Man, even though the
documents in question were necessary to prosecute an alleged
tax evasion in Wales. 35 0 The respondents had tried to evade the
local court's refusal to order disclosure by obtaining an
equivalent decree from a U.K. tribunal. 351 The court of appeal,
however, deferred to the Isle .of Man judiciary, upholding their
refusal as a rightful exercise of sovereignty.35 2 The decision also
took into account the confidentiality expectations of local
branch customers, and noted the unfairness of compelling them
3
to open their records in support of a foreign proceeding.
The court's self-imposed limitation in compelling discovery
from a multinational bank characterizes British sensitivity to the
plight of financial institutions forced to juggle the disclosure regulations of multiple jurisdictions. 5 4 In MacKinnon v. Donaldson
LuJkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. 5 the London branch of a U.S.

bank was similarly excused from producing documents held in
its New York office, on grounds thatjudicial enforcement of the
disclosure request would infringe upon the sovereignty of the
United States. 5 6 The records in question related to the U.S.
conduct of a Bahamian corporation.3

57

The plaintiffs had ne-

glected to obtain the necessary documents until two months
before trial, rendering adherence to Hague Convention procedures impracticable due to time constraints. 358 Therefore, the
plaintiffs applied ex parte to the British court, seeking enforce348. See McCLEAN, supra note 8, at 271-73 (discussing balancing that courts have to

engage in within context of international banking).
349. [1981] 73 Cr.App.R. 302.
350. Id. at 308.
351. Id. at 305.
352. Id. at 308. Lord Denning M.R. noted that should an order issue notwithstanding the Isle of Man court's refusal, a conflict of jurisdiction would ensue. Id.
"That is a conflict which we must always avoid." Id.
353. Id. at 307-08. The court, however, preserved its right to make such an order
in "unusual circumstances," the likes of which did not exist in the present case. Id. at
310.
354. See MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lufkin &Jenrette Securities Corp., [1986] 1 All
E.R. 653, 660 (discussing special position of banks faced with protecting their customers' privacy at risk of sanctions for non-disclosure abroad).
355. [1986] 1 All E.R. 653.
356. Id. at 654.
357. Id. at 665.
358. Id. at 656.
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ment of process served upon the bank's London branch for production of records situated in New York. 5 9
Given the situs of the alleged conduct and the nationality of
its perpetrators, the plaintiff was denied enforcement of the subpoena.3 60 The court stressed that a state should not impose its
jurisdictional demands upon another country's nationals3 6 1 with
respect to their conduct abroad.3 6 Therefore, the judges declined to compel the bank to violate its duty of confidentiality by
exposing its customers' foreign transactions.3 63 The court, however, reserved the right to execute an extraterritorial subpoena,
but limited this exercise to situations where parties specifically
consent to the enforcement of transnational disclosure requests.3 64 Where the suit involves allegations of fraud, the court
36 5
warned that territorial limitations will be severely curtailed.
Nevertheless, the onerous burden imposed on non-U.K subsidiaries forced to comply with domestic discovery orders must be
qualified by a commercial equivalent of hot pursuit, 36 6 or else
must be renounced as an unforgivable transgression upon the
3 67
sovereignty of other countries.
This pronounced aversion to interfering with the jurisdiction of other nations also led the MacKinnon court to denounce
the balancing approach undertaken by U.S. judges. 68 The potential for prejudice inherent in unilaterally weighing the objec359. Id.
360. Id. at 662.
361. Id. at 658. "[A] state should refrain from demanding obedience to its sovereign authority by foreigners in respect of their conduct outside the jurisdiction." Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. Judge Hoffman stated that if every country where a bank operated "asserted a right to require that bank to produce documents relating to accounts kept in

any other such country, banks would be in the unhappy position of being forced to
submit to whichever sovereign was able to apply the greatest pressure." Id.
364. Id. at 658.
365. Id. at 661.
366. See id. (discussing London and County Securities v. Caplan (May 26, 1978,
unreported)). An English bank was ordered to procure documents from its foreign
subsidiaries, relating to embezzlement charges. [1986] 1 All E.R. at 661. The allegation
of criminal fraud, coupled with the need for urgent relief so as to prevent destruction
of the evidence and the fruits of the crime, constituted "exceptional circumstances"
justifying the imposition of a discovery order, which the judge himself called "onerous."

Id. These exceptional circumstances were referred to as the "commercial equivalent of
hot pursuit." Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 662.
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ives of non-U.K litigants against the forum's interests was considered too great to warrant an infringement upon the sovereignty of the adversary state. 69 Thus, a U.S.-style comparative
analysis of conflicting national interests played no part in the
court's holding that the extraterritorial enforcement of a subpoena was held unjustifiable in the absence of urgent necessity
created by circumstances of hot pursuit. 370 The court also supported recourse to the Hague Convention as a precursor to domestic means of discovery by chastising the plaintiffs' delay,
which1 had rendered application to the Convention impractica37

ble.

c. A Balance of Convenience
Although MacKinnon rejected the balancing approach to
settling international discovery disputes, 72 the Commercial
Court nevertheless employed a similar test in XAG v. A Bank.373
The anonymous plaintiffs were non-U.K oil corporations who
had accounts with the London branch of the defendant, a U.S.
bank.3 74 The companies came under investigation in the United
3 75
States concerning their dealings in the crude oil market.
Upon refusing to produce certain documents, a subpoena was
issued to the Bank's London branch requiring it to disclose
records of the plaintiffs held at the bank's New York office.376
When the London branch expressed its intentions to comply
with the subpoena, the plaintiffs obtained injunctions against
discovery on grounds that disclosure would severely impair their
business.377
In upholding the injunctions, the court employed a balance
of convenience to determine which alternative would entail less
harm to all parties.17 1 On one hand, the plaintiffs alleged severe
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. Compare with Societe Nationale Industrielle Atrospatiale v. United States,
482 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that Hague Convention procedures do not have priority
over traditional means of disclosure permitted under U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure).
372. [1986] 1 All E.R. 653, 662.
373. [1983] 2 All E.R. 464.
374. Id. at 464.
375. Id. at 469.
376. Id. at 470.
377. Id. at 472.
378. Id. at 470-71.
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financial trauma should their dealings in politically sensitive
parts of the world be disclosed.3 79 On the other hand, an injunction would impede the NewYork court in the exercise of its jurisdiction extraterritorially, which was considered excessive by U.K.
standards. 3 10 Furthermore, the bank stood little chance of being
held in contempt for non-production based on an injunction issued by the U.K. court.3 8 1 In addition, the plaintiffs had anticipated that their relationship with the London branch would be
governed by British law. 82 To submit their relationship to U.S.
procedural law would, in effect, have required the court to rewrite their contract.38 3 Consequently, the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs, and the injunctions were continued. 8 4
Judge Leggatt also stated that to have allowed the subpoena
to take effect on a bank conducting its business in London
would be to authorize an infringement upon the sovereignty of
the United Kingdom. 8 5 Furthermore, by discontinuing the injunctions, the court would have fostered the enforcement of a
penal proceeding in the United States. 86 Such courtesy would
contradict the international law principle that prohibits enforcement by one nation of another state's penal laws. 8 :
III. ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY THROUGH A
MULTINATIONAL REVIEW PANEL
The difficulties encountered by U.S. and British courts attempting unilaterally to resolve extraterritorial discovery disputes point to the conclusion that this task cannot be successfully undertaken by a single domestic judicial entity. Further379. Id. at 472.
380. Id. at 480.
381. Id. at 474. An injunction issued by the court in the jurisdiction where the
documents are located would amount to a foreign compulsion defense to non-compliance. Id.
382. Id. British law was deemed to be the proper governing law because the contract was, from its inception, executed according to British law. Id.
383. Id. at 477.
384. Id. at 480.
385. Id. at 478. "[T]he fact is that to allow that order to take effect on a bank
conducting its business in the city of London, would be, as it would appear, to allow a
fairly large cuckoo in the domestic nest." Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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more, the drastic differences between the approaches developed
by the United States and the United Kingdom evidence a strong
need for an equitable middle ground that can reconcile conflicting views with regard to the scope of extraterritorial discovery.
The Hague Convention attempted to unify international procedures for obtaining evidence across state borders.3 88 Its approach was deficient, however, in that it only set forth the methods for procuring disclosure abroad, without addressing the
need for a uniform analysis in determining whether discovery
requests should be granted or denied. An internationally accepted framework of discovery that addresses both policy and
procedure still remains to be established.
A. FundamentalFlaws in U.S. Approaches to Extraterritorial
Discovery Conflicts
The U.S. approaches to interjurisdictional discovery disputes do not effectively reconcile the judicial need for information with non-U.S. concerns of confidentiality, nor do they foster
a secure commercial environment for international business enterprises. The pure comity 8 9 analysis employed in First National
City Bank of New York v. IRS,"' ° Ings v. Ferguson,3 '9 and In Re Chase
ManhattanBank, 9 2 failed to recognize that comity and its underlying concern for sovereignty cannot serve as the principal basis
for analysis. Plain deference to foreign legislation neglects the
objectives of U.S. substantive law, and unjustly deprives litigants
of vital information necessary to pursue meritorious claims. This
inequity is exacerbated when a party deliberately insulates documents in a secrecy jurisdiction for the purpose of foiling potential litigation in the United States.
An analysis centered on comity also underestimates the
powers of U.S. regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade
388. See supra notes 44-75 and accompanying text (discussing procedures and provisions of Hague Convention).
389. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing pure comity approach
as motion for deference to secrecy laws abroad).
390. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); see supra notes
179-82 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of First NationalCity Bank of
New York v. IRS).
391. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); see supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text
(discussing facts and holding in Ings v. Ferguson).
392. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); see supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text
(discussing facts and holding in In re Chase Manhattan Bank).
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Commission, to monitor potentially fraudulent activities within
its jurisdiction. The decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson.93 created a false sense of
security for international corporations by implying that the FTC
will not be readily allowed to exercise its investigatory powers
extraterritorially 9 4 The international character of most commercial transactions in today's global economy, 9 however, will
serve to lengthen the jurisdictional arm of U.S. courts, despite
any judicial constraint on federal agencies' powers.3 96
The balancing approach recommended by the Restatement
(Third).9 7 and undertaken by the court in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States, 9 8 has often been criticized as
inherently biased in favor of the forum engaging in the unilateral consideration of competing interests.3 99 Furthermore, Adrospatiale did not conclusively resolve the issue of the Hague Convention's precedence over domestic discovery means. The Court
conditioned recourse to the Convention on the likelihood of
success in obtaining the necessary information, and on the monetary and temporal costs entailed in adhering to Convention
procedures. 40 0 Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify whether
these temporal and fiscal considerations should be given the
same weight as the probability of success in obtaining disclosure."' Adrospatiale also mandated consideration of the respec393. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text
(discussing facts and holding in Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-GobainPont-A-Mousson).
394. 636 F.2d at 1322. Focusing on comity, the court mandated tight judicial control over government agencies threatening to exercise their investigatory powers extraterritorially. Id.
395. See STEPIAN, supra note 6, at 32 (discussing commercial and geographical
expansion of businesses in today's global economy).
396. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing extraterritorial extension of states' jurisdiction over other states' nationals through effects doctrine).
397. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text (discussing criteria utilized by
Restatement (Third) in balancing national interests at stake in extraterritorial disclo-

sure disputes).
398. 482 U.S. 522 (1987); see supra notes 256-71 (discussing facts and holding in
Afrospatiale).
399. See April & Fried, supra note 150, at 967-68 (noting impropriety of balancing

approach in international discovery disputes due to inherent bias of domestic courts
engaged in balancing competing national interests).
400. 482 U.S. at 544-47; see supra note 263 (discussing three-prong test established
by Arospatialefor determining whether recourse to Hague Convention should take precedence over domestic methods of discovery).
401. See Gerber, supra note 18, at 526 (discussing lack of guidance provided by
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tive sovereign interests in application to the Hague.4 °2 The
court did not specify, however, what type of materials suffice in
determining the strength of these interests, or the degree of significance that should be accorded to governmental interventions. This lack of guidance led to contradictory results in later
cases relying on the Adrospatiale precedent."° In addition, the
Court's minimization of blocking legislation 4 overlooked the
severe impact on litigants forced to comply with U.S. disclosure
requests at the risk of civil and penal sanctions abroad.
Cases such as A6rospatiale°5 and Richmark Corp. v. Timber Fall-

ing Consultants40 6 demonstrate an unwavering concern to protect
U.S. investment abroad, but neglect the impact of their doctrines upon the international appeal of U.S. commercial enterprises. Concurrently, these decisions undermine the incentive
to make opportunities for investment available to U.S. nationals,
lest the connection bring the particular enterprise within the
realm of U.S. broad discovery laws and force a forfeiture of confidentiality. The control fostered by the exercise of such jurisdiction over domestic and foreign financial institutions is arguably
desired by every sovereign. This dominion, however, carries the
high cost of undermining the purpose of profitable investment
and the benefits that accrue to a financially prosperous state.

Aerospatiale court in evaluating probability of obtaining information against costs and
time constraints).
402. 482 U.S. at 544.
403. See supra note 269 (discussing varying results of cases using Adrospatialetest to
determine precedence of recourse to Hague Convention); see also A-rwOOD & BRw-

supra note 35, § 18.28, at 337 (discussing competence and impartiality necessary
for courts to balance competing national interests in context of antitrust litigation).
"[Courts] should welcome and appreciate the [views] of foreign governments, but also
understand the failure of a government to make an amicus appearance may reflect that
nation's notions of sovereignty and self-respect, rather than a lack of interest or concern." Id.
404. 482 U.S. at 544. The court stated that blocking legislation should not be regarded as a bar to discovery, but should only be considered in identifying the nature of
a state's interest in protecting certain information. Id.
405. Id. at 522,
406. 959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992); see supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding in Richmark).
STER,
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B. Inadequacies Inherent in the British Approach to Resolving
ExtraterritorialDiscovery Conflicts
The Rio Tinto Zinc40 7 litigation espoused a strong protectionist policy that limits compliance of British nationals with broad
discovery orders issued by foreign sovereigns, especially where
disclosure could expose U.K. entities to penalties abroad.4" 8 The
specificity requirement imposed by the court on extraterritorial
disclosure requests protects against the monetary and temporal
burdens characteristic of extensive discovery under U.S. procedural rules. 4 9 The opinion, however, ignored the potential prejudice to litigants forced to adjudicate their claims without necessary facts. Moreover, the unilateral application of protectionist
principles by English courts could become a disguised form of
favoritism that discounts the complex issues entailed in multinational litigation. Just as a potential lack of confidentiality can
frustrate commercial ties to U.S. corporations, investment in
U.K. companies can be deterred for fear that litigation will be
impaired by the secrecy bestowed upon British nationals.
The deferential approach employed in MacKinnon v. Don411
4 10
aldson LuJkin & Jenrette Securities Corp. and R v. Grossman
displays a strong concern for the confidentiality interests of sovereigns that open their borders to multinational banks.4 1 2 While
these holdings may have sharpened the competitive edges of
British banks operating in confidential regimes, they also furthered the handicap of litigants left to adjudicate meritorious
suits without adequate discovery. The balance of convenience
undertaken in XAG v. A Bank41 1 mirrored the criterion analysis
employed by the Restatement (Third) 414 and denounced by the
407. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434; see supra notes 315-29 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.).
408. Id. at 478.
409. Id. at 442.
410. [1986] All E.R. 653; see supra notes 355-71 and accompanying text (discussing
facts and holding of MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lulkin &Jenrette Securities Corp.).
. 411. [1981] 73 Cr. App. R. 302 (CA); see supra notes 349-53 and accompanying
text (discussing facts and holding in R. v. Grossman).
412. See MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lufkin &Jenrette Securities Corp., [1986] 1 All
E.R. 653, 660 (discussing special position of banks faced with protecting their customers' privacy at risk of sanctions for non-disclosure abroad).
413. [1983] 2 All E.R. 464; see supra notes 373-87 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding in X AG v. A Bank).
414. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing balancing criteria
used by Restatement (Third)).
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court in MacKinnon.4 15 This balancing approach is arguably

more equitable than the pure comity and protectionist ideologies espoused by earlier British decisions. The unilateral determination of adversarial national interests, however, entails the
same difficulties encountered by U.S. courts. More specifically,
the ability of a court to objectively measure these antagonistic
concerns is necessarily limited by a strong incentive to uphold its
4 16
own forum's rules.

C. Proposalfor a MultinationalProceduralReview Panelfor the
Adjudication of ExtraterritorialDiscovery Disputes
The foundation for such a system has already been laid
through the establishment of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").4' Indeed, litigants who found themselves embroiled in
the international web of disclosure regulations have appealed to
this tribunal for relief.4"' The ICJ, however, has limited its assistance in these matters by requiring parties to exhaust procedural
remedies available in their respective jurisdictions before consenting to hear their claims. 419 Unfortunately, the added monetary and temporal expenses in pursuing domestic alternatives
have hardly benefitted the litigants or their respective judiciaries.42° Nor has this policy served to consolidate the myriad of
conflicting criteria used by national courts to settle discovery
conflicts into a unified body of rules.
1. Proposed Structure of Procedural Panel
The ICJ should incorporate a multinational panel to provide for interlocutory as well as final appeals to resolve extraterri415. MacKinnon, [1986] 1 All E.R. 653, 662.

416. See April & Fried, supra note 150, at 968 (arguing that balancing approach is
tainted by inherent bias of national courts).

417. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing establishment, structure, and jurisdiction of ICJ).
418. See Interhandel Case, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (Swiss company appealed to ICj to
modify discovery order issued by U.S. court based on prohibition of disclosure in Switzerland).
419. Id. The ICJ declined to take the claim on the basis that Switzerland had not
exhausted her legal remedies in the United States before submitting the claim to the
ICJ. Id.
420. See ATrWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 35, § 18.26, at 335 (discussing added
expenses in unilateral adjudication of variant national interests and resultant broad
discovery within context of antitrust litigation).
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torial discovery disputes. 4 21 The jurisdiction of this panel should
be invoked by consent of the parties to the discovery claim in
dispute.4 2 2 The determinations of the panel should be conclusive and without further recourse of appeal to domestic courts.
The panel presiding over any dispute should consist of an
odd number of judges, with no more than two members from

the particular adversary nations, as well as two or more additional parties from neutral sovereigns. All cases undertaken by
this panel should be decided by a majority vote. The members
of the particular adversary forums would provide knowledge of
the regulations in issue, while the neutral judges would bring
their own objective perspectives to the deliberations. Furthermore, the multinational make-up of the panel would enable a
more comprehensive understanding of the impact of its decisions on the global commercial community.
In addition, interlocutory appeals should be subject to strict
temporal limitations, so as to ensure prompt settlement of discovery disputes. After all, a primary benefit of this panel will be
to reduce the financial expenses incurred by litigants through
lengthy international discovery battles. The swift adjudication of
these conflicts, whether through interlocutory or final appeals,
will also comport with the interests of judicial economy in international and domestic fora.
2. Proposed Analytical Framework
The recommended framework of analysis that should be undertaken by this panel in determining whether to grant discovery requests and compel production through sanctions involves
a four-prong test. First, the court must decide whether the infor421. ICJ Statute, supra note 165, 29 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 26 and Article 29 permit the ICJ to incorporate a similar panel for adjudication of certain disputes.
Id. art. 26, 59 Stat. at 1058, 3 Bevans at 1184; art. 29, 59 Stat. at 1058, 3 Bevans at 1184.
"The court may, from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or
more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of
cases." Id. art. 26, 59 Stat. at 1058, 3 Bevans at 1184. "With a view to the speedy despatch of business, the Court shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges
which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure." Id. art. 29, 59 Stat. at 1058, 3 Bevans at 1184.
422. Id. art. 36, 59 Stat. at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179. The jurisdiction of the ICJ itself
is voluntary as well as compulsory in certain matters. Id. Nevertheless, the Iq should
set forth voluntaryjurisdiction only for this proposed panel, as authorized by Article 30.
Id. art. 30, 59 Stat. at 1058, 3 Bevans at 1184. "The court shall frame rules for carrying
out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure." Id.
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mation requested is relevant to the particular claim. This determination should be based on a high standard, mandating the
proponent of disclosure to prove that the data is not only pertinent, but also necessary in the present suit. Concurrently, the
conditions of "relevant and necessary" discovery would enable
the panel to screen frivolous requests without hindering legitimate information needs.
Furthermore, the panel must demand a high degree of
specificity in any discovery demands submitted by litigants.
Should the request be too vague or cumulative in nature, the
panel should not hesitate to employ a blue pencil 423 approach.
A petition that solicits unspecified data that could merely lead to
usable evidence should be considered in the determination of
the requesting party's good faith. Consequently, if that litigant's
purpose in asking for the information is merely to harass opponents or delay the proceeding, the request for discovery should
be dismissed.
Second, the court must necessarily decide whether discovery
would violate any nation's laws, by undertaking a complete examination of the particular non-disclosure prohibition and its
legislative history. Thirdly, if this analysis reveals a potential violation, the court must weigh that sovereign's interests in confidentiality against the particular litigant's need for full discovery.
Factors such as the country's objectives in enacting the secrecy
laws should be examined, as well as any government interventions from either nation. Furthermore, the burden imposed on
the party or non-party required to produce should be weighed
against the potential handicap inflicted on its adversary in adjudicating a claim without the information in question. If the fairness scale tips heavily in favor of production, discovery should be
mandated.
If the interests at stake are substantially equal, the panel
should proceed to the last prong of the analysis. At this point,
the party requesting production should prove by a preponderance of the evidence or a similar civil standard, that its opponent
manifested bad faith in refusing to comply with the request. Bad
faith could be inferred from acts including, but not limited to,
collusion between that party and a secrecy jurisdiction, or
423. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (defining blue pencil approach as
remediary editing by court of ambiguous discovery requests).
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through the litigant's exploitation of information havens.
Should bad faith be proven, discovery must be ordered, and if
necessary compelled through sanctions. If insufficient evidence
of bad faith is adduced, the request must be dismissed in whole
or in part, and the claim remitted to the domestic court qualified to hear it based on the discovery authorized by the panel.
This process ofjudicial collaboration would promote comity
by enabling a more equitable balancing of national interests that
could not be achieved through the inconsistent application of
unilaterally developed standards. Without this cooperation, international commercial litigation will be handicapped by protectionist idealogies and biases inherent in the domestic adjudication of claims. Furthermore, commercial relationships in today's global economy will be disadvantaged by the lack of
predictability engendered by conflicting judicial standards.
CONCLUSION
A uniform system of international discovery comports with
the objectives of judicial economy, comity, and fairness to litigants. A structured framework of analysis applied objectively by
a neutral forum will reduce the incentives of states to create secrecy havens that hinder the adjudication of commercial claims.
Furthermore, it will foster predictability in international commercial transactions and facilitate global economic development.

